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Standing by Your Man Ray:  Troubles with Antitrust Standing 
in Art Authentication Cases 
Swift Edgar* 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1989, Joe Simon-Whelan, an intimate of Andy Warhol, purchased one of the 
artist’s silk-screened self portraits for $195,000.1  Fred Hughes, the chairman of the 
Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, signed an authentication of the 
portrait, certifying that it was genuine.2  In 2001, Simon-Whelan’s investment 
appeared prescient:  a buyer was prepared to part with $2,000,000 in exchange for 
the painting.3  However, members of the Andy Warhol Art Authentication Board, 
an entity created eight years after the Foundation, encouraged the buyer not to 
purchase the portrait until the Board had authenticated it.4  After Simon-Whelan 
eventually submitted the painting to the Board, the Board denied that Andy Warhol 
had authored the artwork.5  The Board invited Simon-Whelan to resubmit his silk-
screen with additional documentation; Simon-Whelan did, and the board denied the 
portrait’s authenticity a second time.6 
This denial of authenticity may seem innocuous.  After all, connoisseurship is a 
rarified and contentious art, and disagreements about the authorship of artworks 
can persist for decades.7  But more is at stake than expert opinion.  Art 
 
 * Law Clerk to the Honorable Cynthia M. Rufe, United States District Court, Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania.  The views expressed herein are those of the author alone. 
 1. Michael Shnayerson, Judging Andy, VANITY FAIR, Nov. 2003, at 201. 
 2. Id.  The Warhol Foundation was created in 1987 pursuant to Warhol’s will.  Id.; Entity 
Information, The Andy Warhol Foundation For The Visual Arts, Inc., N.Y. STATE, DEPT. OF STATE, 
DIV. OF CORPS., available via http://www.dos.ny.gov/corps/bus_entity_search.html (last visited Nov. 26, 
2013).  Throughout this Note, it is assumed that “genuine” and “not genuine” are labels that can be 
definitively affixed to works of art.  This assumption is in line with the practices of art authentication 
boards, even if the meaning of “authenticity” is slippery at best, and even sometimes nonexistent (or at 
least irrelevant).  See WALTER BENJAMIN, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, 
in ILLUMINATIONS 224, 224 n.2 (Harry Zohn trans., 1969) (“From a photographic negative, for example, 
one can make any number of prints; to ask for the ‘authentic’ print makes no sense. . . . Precisely 
because authenticity is not reproducible, the intensive penetration of certain (mechanical) processes of 
reproduction was instrumental in differentiating and grading authenticity.”).. 
 3. Shnayerson, supra note 1, at 201. 
 4. Id.;  see also Amended Class Action Complaint at ¶¶ 149, 151, Simon-Whelan v. Andy 
Warhol Found. for the Visual Arts, Inc., No. 07-CV-6423(LTS) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2007); Entity 
Information, Andy Warhol Art Authentication Board, N.Y. STATE, DEPT. OF STATE, DIV. OF CORPS., 
available via http://www.dos.ny.gov/corps/bus_entity_search.html (last visited Dec. 9, 2013).. 
 5. Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 4, at ¶ 155. 
 6. Id. at ¶ 165. 
 7. See generally THE EXPERT VERSUS THE OBJECT:  JUDGING FAKES AND FALSE ATTRIBUTIONS 
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authentication boards wield tremendous power over the art market:  authenticated 
works by important artists have considerable value, while a work denied 
authentication can be virtually impossible to sell.8  Additionally, common practices 
among authentication boards can open them up to controversy.  Board members 
often have a financial stake in the market for an artist’s works, largely because 
boards are populated with the people most knowledgeable about a given artist, who 
tend to be his or her collectors or family members.9  Owners of an artist’s works 
have an obvious conflict of interest in making authenticity determinations about 
that artist.  The fewer genuine works of a particular artist available, the more 
valuable each authenticated work becomes. 
The Andy Warhol Art Authentication Board has been a particularly frequent 
subject of criticism, partly because of its dealings with Simon-Whelan, and partly 
for other high profile decisions.10  People with a financial interest in the sale of 
Warhol’s oeuvre sat on the Authentication Board at the outset of its existence,11 
and at the end of Simon-Whelan’s dealings with the Board, at least one employee 
of the Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts sat on the Board.12  The 
conflicts of interest between the Board-as-authenticator and the Foundation-as-
collector created especially bad incentives in determining authenticity, since the 
Foundation owned about $500,000,000 worth of Warhol’s artwork.  Because 
 
IN THE VISUAL ARTS (Ronald D. Spencer ed., 2005).  Spencer’s book argues in large part that those who 
determine authenticity of artworks should be shielded from liability.  Id.  The editor was, perhaps 
coincidentally, the legal representative of the Andy Warhol Art Authentication Board.  Amended Class 
Action Complaint, supra note 4, at ¶ 72. 
 8. Cf. Thome v. Alexander & Louisa Calder Found., 70 A.D.3d 88, 95 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009), 
appeal denied, 933 N.E.2d 216 (N.Y. 2010) (accepting plaintiff’s contention that failure to include a 
sculpture in Alexander Calder’s catalogue raisonné rendered the artwork “essentially unmarketable”). 
 9. See, e.g., Dick Grant, Panel 2:  The Rights and Responsibilities of Authenticating Art, 35 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 393, 416 (2012) (“[O]ur authentication committee’s primary members are the three 
family members of [abstract expressionist] Richard Diebenkorn.”). 
 10. See, e.g., Eileen Kinsella, The Brillo-Box Scandal, ARTNEWS (Nov. 1, 2009), 
http://www.artnews.com/2009/11/01/the-brillo-box-scandal (detailing Board’s failure to reevaluate 
clearly erroneous grant of authenticity to several Brillo Boxes falsely attributed to Warhol); Adrian Levy 
& Cathy Scott-Clark, Warhol’s Box of Tricks, GUARDIAN (Aug. 20, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
artanddesign/2010/aug/21/warhol-brillo-boxes-scandal-fraud (coupling the Brillo scandal with 
allegations of Board’s vindictiveness and inaccuracy); Eileen Kinsella, The Trouble With Warhol, 
ARTNEWS (Apr. 1, 2011), http://www.artnews.com/2011/04/01/the-trouble-with-warhol (“In the 15 
years since the authentication board was created, it has frequently come under fire for what some 
observers have considered secretive, arbitrary, or biased decision making.”); Shnayerson, supra note 1, 
at 196 (“In the netherworld of great artists’ estates, some panel of experts is usually on tap to determine 
the authenticity of once humble paintings that now sell for millions of dollars.  They may debate, they 
may equivocate.  None, though, has seemed so capricious as the Andy Warhol board.”).  The denial of 
authenticity to Simon-Whelan’s portrait has even inspired its own art exhibition, Warhol Denied.  See 
generally CHARLES LUTZ PRODUCTIONS, http://www.warholdenied.com (last visited Nov. 17, 2013). 
 11. Shnayerson, supra note 1, at 211; Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 4, at ¶ 8. 
 12. Kate Taylor, Is Authentication a Game of Monopoly?, N. Y. SUN, Oct. 5, 2007, at 16 (“A 
recent article in the New York Times quoted the Warhol Foundation’s chief financial officer, K. C. 
Maurer, as stating that the foundation is wholly separate from the authentication board, but that is not 
true.  One of the board’s five members, Sally King-Nero, is also an employee of the foundation.”); see 
also Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 4, at ¶ 70 (naming four people who work 
simultaneously for the Board and the Foundation). 
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Warhol was such a prolific artist, the impression that his work is scarce would 
likely have a more dramatic impact on his prices than on those of an artist whose 
works are genuinely scarce.13 
After the second denial of authenticity, Simon-Whelan sued the Board, the 
Foundation and others.14  He alleged a conspiracy in restraint of trade, in violation 
of section 1 of the Sherman Act, and he alleged that the Foundation either had 
monopolized or attempted to monopolize the market for artwork by Andy Warhol, 
in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act.15  The defendants moved to dismiss 
the complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted; the court 
denied the motion.16  It was the first time that an antitrust claim based on art 
authentication practices survived a motion to dismiss.17  Simon-Whelan’s claim 
settled before trial, precluding appellate review. 
In order to state an antitrust claim, a plaintiff must allege with some 
particularity:  “(1) a violation of antitrust law; (2) injury and causation; and (3) 
damages.”18  Additionally, a plaintiff must demonstrate that she has “antitrust 
standing,” a requirement distinct from standing under Article III of the Constitution 
(though that of course must be satisfied as well).19  In Simon-Whelan v. Andy 
Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, Inc., the court held that the plaintiff lacked 
standing on his claim of conspiracy to inflate the prices of art by Warhol (the 
section 1 claim) because he did not purchase artwork from the defendants.20  The 
court held that Simon-Whelan had standing on his monopolization claim (the 
section 2 claim)—since he intended to sell the painting, he was a potential 
competitor with the Foundation in the market for Warhol’s art.21 
This Note examines the doctrine and policies of antitrust standing and their 
interaction with the art market.  Part I explains why art authenticators may find 
 
 13. In the Matters of Determination of Legal Fees Payable by Estate of Warhol, No. 824/87, 1994 
WL 245246, at *1 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. Apr. 14, 1994).  In that litigation, the Foundation argued that its 
holdings were worth $103,353,738, discounting to present value the amount for which it believed it 
could sell its holdings.  Id.  The court characterized the valuation as “based on selective and limited use 
of the available data and . . . otherwise prepared without regard to the governing legal principles.”  Id. at 
*1-2.  For more on the importance of scarcity in the art market, see DON THOMPSON, THE $12 MILLION 
STUFFED SHARK:  THE CURIOUS ECONOMICS OF CONTEMPORARY ART 64 (2008); for a discussion of 
stakeholders’ differing opinions about how flooding the market with minor Warhol works will affect 
prices, see Robin Pogrebin, Foundation Aims to Sell or Donate All Its Warhols, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 
2012, at C7. 
 14. Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 4. 
 15. Id. at ¶¶ 211-226. 
 16. Simon-Whelan v. Andy Warhol Found. for the Visual Arts, Inc.,, No. 07-CV-6423(LTS), 
2009 WL 1457177, at *6, *9 (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 2009). 
 17. Gareth S. Lacy, Standardizing Warhol:  Antitrust Liability for Denying the Authenticity of 
Artwork, 6 WASH. J. L. TECH. & ARTS 185, 191 (2011). 
 18. In re Ethylene Propylene Diene Monomer Antitrust Litig., 256 F.R.D. 82, 87 (D. Conn. 2009) 
(quoting Cordes & Co. Fin. Services, Inc. v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 502 F.3d 91, 104105 (2d Cir. 
2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 19. See infra Part I.B for a discussion of the requirements of antitrust standing. 
 20. Simon-Whelan, 2009 WL 1457177, at *8.  The court also dismissed this claim for falling 
outside of the statute of limitations.  Id. 
 21. Id. 
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themselves defendants in antitrust suits.  It then describes the legal rules of antitrust 
standing propounded by the Supreme Court, interpreted (in wildly divergent ways) 
in the Circuits, applied in Simon-Whelan and discussed in scholarly literature.  Part 
II surveys the market for modern art and the courts’ relationship to it.  Part III 
argues first that the Simon-Whelan court engaged in the wrong antitrust standing 
analysis as a matter of doctrine, and that the court should have followed the Second 
Circuit’s precedent, which does not look to the plaintiff’s status as a consumer or 
competitor in the relevant market (the “consumer-or-competitor test”).  Second, 
even if the consumer-or-competitor test were the appropriate inquiry in the Second 
Circuit, the Simon-Whelan court applied it incorrectly:  the court held that the 
plaintiff lacked standing because he was not a consumer who purchased from the 
defendant, when the correct question is whether he was a consumer in the relevant 
market.  Finally, Part III argues that the goal of antitrust standing should be to 
identify the plaintiff best suited to enforce the antitrust laws without risking 
multiple recoveries from the defendant for a single violation, and that the art 
context does not alter courts’ traditional institutional competence in adjudicating 
disputes between parties and in finding facts that may support or undercut asserted 
violations of antitrust laws. 
Art cases occur most frequently in the state and federal courts in Manhattan, and 
the cases tend to rely on one another regardless of the substantive area of law 
involved.22  Because this area of litigation is highly concentrated and self-
referential, and because Simon-Whelan offers a precedent for a successful antitrust 
claim, the case presents a risk that other courts will compound its errors.  This Note 
offers a framework for an antitrust standing analysis that allows suits by plaintiffs 
who are best positioned to vindicate the goals of antitrust laws in the context of an 
increasingly significant area of case law and scholarship—art authentication. 
I.  THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE OF ANTITRUST CASES IN ART AND 
ANTITRUST STANDING 
Disappointed by refusals to authenticate, owners of art have brought antitrust 
suits against people and entities that the art market trusts to make authenticity 
determinations, such as art authentication boards (“Boards”).  Boards, as their name 
implies, determine whether or not a given work of art may genuinely be attributed 
to an artist.  Boards are typically associated with one particular artist, and generally 
each artist only has one Board that authenticates her work.23  Boards’ authenticity 
 
 22. See, e.g., the product disparagement case Thome v. Alexander & Louisa Calder Found., 70 
A.D.3d 88, 105 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009), leave to appeal denied, 933 N.E.2d 216 (N.Y. 2010) (citing the 
slander of title case Hahn v. Duveen, 133 Misc. 871 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1929)); Thome, 70 A.D.3d at 111 
(citing the monopolization case Simon-Whelan, 2009 WL 1457177); Simon-Whelan, 2009 WL 1457177, 
at *6 (citing the essential facilities case Kramer v. Pollock-Krasner Foundation, 890 F. Supp. 250 
(S.D.N.Y. 1995)).  Art cases, of course, also cite to other art cases that sound in the same doctrine.  See, 
e.g., Thome, 70 A.D.3d at 105 (citing Kirby v. Wildenstein, 784 F. Supp. 1112 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)); Simon-
Whelan, 2009 WL 1457177, at *6 (citing Vitale v. Marlborough Gallery, 93-CV-6276(PKL), 1994 WL 
654494 (S.D.N.Y. July 5, 1994)). 
 23. For example, the Pollock-Krasner Authentication Board evaluates whether artwork submitted 
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determinations are taken seriously by the art market and can have a tremendous 
effect on the value of a work of art.24  Part I.A briefly outlines the basic elements of 
an antitrust case and then explains how those elements may be applied against 
Boards.  Part I.B then discusses in some detail the concept of antitrust standing. 
A.  ANTITRUST LAW IN (VERY) BRIEF25 
1.  The Complaint and the Defense 
The elements of an antitrust claim are:  “(1) a violation of antitrust law; (2) 
injury and causation; and (3) damages.”26  The two most common violations are 
breaches of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.27  To make out a violation of 
section 1, a plaintiff must demonstrate collusion that restrains or threatens to 
restrain trade in a specific geographic and product market.  Section 2 prohibits 
monopolization of a relevant geographic and product market.28 
Depending on the factual situation, courts take one of two approaches to 
analyzing section 1 claims.  Complaints may state “per se” violations of antitrust 
laws, or they may state violations that need to be subjected to the “rule of reason” 
analysis, under which courts weigh the alleged anticompetitive activity against any 
procompetitive effects it may have.29  A per se violation has such clearly harmful 
effects on competition that it “always or almost always tends to raise price or to 
reduce output.”30  An agreement by competitors to fix prices is a prototypical per se 
 
to it was created by Jackson Pollock, Kramer v. Pollock-Krasner Found., 890 F. Supp. at 253, while the 
Andy Warhol Art Authentication Board “is responsible for authenticating the works of Andy Warhol.”  
Simon-Whelan, 2009 WL 1457177, at *1. 
 24. Indeed, more is at stake than money.  While it is obvious that a work of art authoritatively 
declared “fake” will sell for less than one deemed “real,” it is also true that “[t]he authenticity of a work 
of visual art has always been a critical issue for anyone concerned with art, not simply for the work’s 
monetary value, but for its intrinsic worth.”  Ronald D. Spencer, Introduction, in THE EXPERT VERSUS 
THE OBJECT:  JUDGING FAKES AND FALSE ATTRIBUTIONS IN THE VISUAL ARTS, supra note 7, at xi. 
 25. This discussion is meant to equip the reader with the antitrust vocabulary employed in this 
Note.  It is necessarily drawn in broad strokes and omits a great deal. 
 26. In re Ethylene Propylene Diene Monomer Antitrust Litig., 256 F.R.D. 82, 87 (D. Conn. 2009) 
(quoting Cordes & Co. Fin. Services, Inc. v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 502 F.3d 91, 104105 (2d Cir. 
2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 27. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (2013).  The Clayton Act specifies additional antitrust violations, some of 
which overlap with Sherman Act violations.  15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27, 52–53.  Sometimes, cases in this Note 
refer to Clayton Act violations.  Standing analysis is the same under either act.  Since complaints in the 
art context are more likely to allege Sherman Act violations, this Part does not discuss the Clayton Act, 
except to the extent that it grants a private right of action to those injured by antitrust violations.  See 
infra Part I.B.1. 
 28. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2013); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320-21 (1962) 
(geographic and product markets). 
 29. Some commentators see per se and rule of reason analyses as points on a spectrum and 
include a “quick look” inquiry between these poles.  For a discussion of the approaches to examining 
allegedly anticompetitive conduct, see generally California Dental Ass’n v. F.T.C., 526 U.S. 756 (1999). 
 30. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm., Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among 
Competitors § 3.2 (April 2000). 
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violation.31 
In a rule of reason case, the plaintiff needs to define the geographic and product 
market in which she alleges the defendants violated the antitrust laws.32  This 
requirement exists because courts need some context to evaluate the competition 
the defendants face.  As the Supreme Court put it, in a frequently quoted passage, 
the antitrust laws protect “competition, not competitors.”33  After defining the 
market, a section 1 plaintiff must then demonstrate that the defendants exercised 
market power in a way that harmed the plaintiff.  “Market power is the power ‘to 
force a purchaser to do something that he would not do in a competitive market,’” 
like paying exorbitant prices or buying additional products.34  The exercise of 
market power by an actor in concert with another actor amounts to an illegal 
“combination in restraint of trade,” in the words of the Sherman Act.35 
Courts generally analyze section 2 claims under the rule of reason.36  A section 2 
plaintiff must show that the defendant possessed monopoly power and wielded it 
harmfully.  Monopoly power is somewhat more difficult to define than market 
power,37 but certainly amounts to “something greater than market power under 
§ 1.”38  It has been defined as “the power to control prices or exclude 
competition.”39  It can also be seen as differing only in degree from market power; 
under this definition, monopoly power is nothing more than substantial market 
power.40  An exercise of monopoly power with anticompetitive effects violates 
section 2 of the Sherman Act. 
Once a plaintiff has alleged a prima facie case sounding in antitrust, the 
defendant may employ all the ordinary tools at the disposal of a civil defendant, 
like a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment.  In a rule of reason 
case, a defendant may invoke the affirmative defense that the procompetitive 
 
 31. Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc., 457 U.S. 332, 348 (1982) (“Our decisions foreclose the 
argument that the agreements at issue escape per se condemnation because they are horizontal and fix 
maximum prices.”).  
 32. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 377, 393 (1957).  For a critique of 
the Supreme Court’s case law on market definition, see RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 147-157 
(2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter Posner, Antitrust Law]. 
 33. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962). 
 34. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 464 (1992) (quoting 
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 14 (1984)). 
 35. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2013).  Commentators disagree about whether tacit collusion violates the 
antitrust laws or whether the collusion must be overt.  Posner, Antitrust Law, supra note 32, at 60-69. 
 36. Dep’t of Justice and Fed. Trade Comm., Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International 
Operations § 2.1 (April 1995) (“[T]raditional per se offenses of the law . . . typically involve . . .  cartel 
activities”). 
 37. See, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE 150 (2005) 
(“‘Monopolization’ . . . is the most poorly defined antitrust offense.  The statute tells us nothing about 
what it means to ‘monopolize,’ and the common law history is not helpful.”). 
 38. Id. at 481. 
 39. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 389 (1956). 
 40. Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 899 F.2d 951, 967 (10th Cir. 1990) 
(quoting PHILIP E. AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW § 801 (1978); see also 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 37, at 151 (“The offense of monopolization requires proof of a dominant firm 
with substantial market power and at least one qualifying ‘exclusionary’ practice.”). 
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benefits of its challenged activity outweigh any anticompetitive effects.41 
2.  Cases Against Standards-Setting Organizations in General, and Art 
Authentication Boards in Particular 
The antitrust cases that are most like suits against authentication boards are suits 
against standards-setting organizations.42  One major standards-setting antitrust 
case, which is perhaps most analogous to suits against art authenticators, is Radiant 
Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co.43  Radiant Burners concerned the 
American Gas Association (AGA), a group of ten companies, including six 
manufacturers of gas burners, that determined whether or not gas burners were safe 
to use.44  The market to purchase gas burners was primarily made up of stove 
manufacturers.  These manufacturers relied on the AGA’s seal of approval as an 
assurance of safety and would not purchase a gas burner lacking the AGA’s 
imprimatur.  Radiant Burners was a non-AGA company that made gas burners, and 
the AGA declined to certify that Radiant’s products were safe. 
Alleging a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, Radiant sued AGA and 
others.  The district court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss, and the Seventh 
Circuit affirmed.  Because Radiant had failed to allege a buyer-seller relationship 
with defendants or a joint refusal on the part of the defendants to deal with the 
plaintiffs, the court held Radiant had failed to allege any “boycott, conspiracy to 
boycott or other form of per se violation.”45  The Supreme Court reversed, holding 
that the complaint’s allegation that AGA conspired to deny approval to Radiant, 
thereby unfairly restricting Radiant’s ability to sell its burners, stated a claim under 
section 1 of the Sherman Act.46 
Radiant Burners and similar cases matter for plaintiffs in the art authentication 
context because they establish that failure to issue a certification can satisfy one 
part of an antitrust claim, if all the other elements of a violation are met.47  
However, two features distinguish Radiant Burners and the other standards-setting 
cases from cases against art authentication boards.  First, arbiters of authenticity in 
the art market exert continual power over works of art.  The AGA could not 
reemerge twenty years after a certified product was sold and destroy its resale 
 
 41. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104 (1984) 
(“Under the Sherman Act the criterion to be used in judging the validity of a restraint on trade is its 
impact on competition.”). 
 42. See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass’n. v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 768-69 (1999); FTC v. Super. Ct. Trial 
Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990); Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 
509 (1988); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961); Cont’l 
Airline, Inc. v United Airlines, Inc., 277 F.3d 499 (4th Cir. 2002); Jessup v. Am. Kennel Club, Inc., 61 
F. Supp. 2d 5 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff’d per curiam, 210 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Lacy, supra note 
17, at 205-211 (2011). 
 43. 364 U.S. 656. 
 44. 364 U.S. at 658. 
 45. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co., 273 F.2d 196, 199 (7th Cir. 1959). 
 46. 364 U.S. at 659-60. 
 47. For similar cases, see supra note 42. 
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value.48  Second, in all the standards-setting cases that have occurred outside of the 
art market, the plaintiffs were in direct competition with the defendants, making for 
a more obvious conflict of interest than that in cases of art authentication.49 
Despite differences from standards-setting organizations, art authenticators exert 
power over submarkets in art, even without owning or selling any share of products 
in the relevant market.  Although the Boards are not necessarily producers or 
sellers of art, they control the supply of authentic art in the marketplace.  By 
controlling supply, they can force participants in the market to act in ways that they 
would not in a competitive market:  for example, market participants may buy 
inauthentic work for high prices or sell authentic work at low prices.50  In a 
competitive market—one with low transaction and information costs and in which 
prices accurately reflect value—purchasers would not assume the risk of erroneous 
authentication decisions.  Instead, the market would reliably set the price for given 
works of modern art, without fear that the market value would crash at any second 
upon an adverse determination of authenticity.  Inaccurate determinations of 
authenticity by art boards introduce inefficiency into the market, which increases 
the information costs for buyers looking to buy genuine articles, as well as creating 
other problems.51 
The basic complaint of an antitrust plaintiff against an art authentication board 
would be that the board, either with another entity or on its own, exercised its 
market power in a way that damaged the plaintiff.52  This damage might occur if a 
board falsely declared that art owned by the plaintiff was not genuine,53 or even if a 
board had such a bad reputation that the market incorporated the risk that the 
board’s declaration of authenticity was false, lowering prices and causing dealers to 
lose profits.54  Whatever the facts alleged, a plaintiff must show antitrust standing, 
to which this Note now turns. 
B.  ANTITRUST STANDING 
The first element of an antitrust claim is a violation of antitrust law.  The second 
 
 48. Cf. Shnayerson, supra note 1, at 204 (collecting accounts of art owners whose stock was 
suddenly devalued by declarations of inauthenticity by the Andy Warhol Art Authentication Board). 
 49. See supra note 42 for the relevant cases. 
 50. Cf. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 464 (1992) (“Market 
power is the power ‘to force a purchaser to do something that he would not do in a competitive 
market.’” (quoting Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 14)). 
 51. Cf. Shnayerson, supra note 1, at 204-11. 
 52. See Steven Reiss, Panel 2:  The Rights and Responsibilities of Authenticating Art, 35 Colum. 
J.L. & Arts 393, 400-01 (2012) (discussing how to state an antitrust claim premised on art 
authentication). 
 53. Simon-Whelan v. Andy Warhol Found. For The Visual Arts, Inc., 1:07-cv-6423 (LTS) 2009 
WL 1457177 (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 2009). 
 54. Such a claim would be unusual and difficult to prove, but at least one lawyer has argued that 
it accurately describes the market for modern art.  See Richard A. Altman, Panel 2:  The Rights and 
Responsibilities of Authenticating Art, 35 Colum. J.L. & Arts 393, 395 (2012) (“I feel that essentially 
you have a situation where [a board] actually has the power to drive down the price of art because it 
increases the uncertainty that any buyer who has to go to a foundation would have.”). 
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element, “injury,” has been limited to “antitrust injury,” or, as the Supreme Court 
has put it, “injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent.”55  On top 
of these elements, a plaintiff must describe the relevant market in which the 
violation has taken place (in a rule of reason case), and he must, in all cases, have 
antitrust standing.  Antitrust standing is a prudential bar to recovery (unlike the 
distinct constitutional requirement of Article III standing that exists in every law 
suit) that courts have erected in interpreting the Clayton Act.56 
Part I.B.1 of this Note introduces the Clayton Act’s grant of a right of action to 
those injured by antitrust violations.  Parts I.B.2 through 4 discuss the interpretation 
of that statutory grant by various courts, including the Supreme Court, the Circuit 
Courts of Appeals and the District Court for the Southern District of New York (in 
Simon-Whelan).  Part I.C summarizes scholarly analysis of antitrust standing. 
1.  Statutory Background 
The Clayton Act grants a private right of action, and potentially treble damages, 
to “[a]ny person . . . injured in his business or property by reason of anything 
forbidden in the antitrust laws.”57  The Sherman Act declares that “[e]very contract, 
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or 
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be 
illegal.”58  Thus, the Clayton Act allows private citizens to sue for damages caused 
by violation of the Sherman Act.  But courts have imposed a prudential limitation 
on antitrust standing, because a literal reading of these statutes would be overly 
broad:  after all, every contract restrains trade.59  For example, a subcontractor 
outbid by a competitor is “injured in his business” when the general contractor 
accepts a lower bid, forming a contract that restrains trade.  The antitrust laws could 
not function if any person disadvantaged by a normal contract had standing to sue 
under the Clayton Act. 
Instead of a literal reading of the Clayton and Sherman Acts, courts have used 
the antitrust statutes as a starting point to create federal common law regulating 
 
 55. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977). 
 56. Some courts consider antitrust injury to be a necessary but insufficient part of antitrust 
standing (see, e.g., Arroyo-Melecio v. Puerto Rican Am. Ins. Co., 398 F.3d 56, 72 (1st Cir. 2005)), while 
others fold the injury and standing inquiries together (see, e.g., MacPherson’s Inc. v. Windermere Real 
Estate Services Co., 100 F. App’x 651, 654 (9th Cir. 2004)), and still others treat the two concepts as 
analytically distinct (see, e.g., Greater Rockford Energy & Tech. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 998 F.2d 391, 
395 (7th Cir. 1993)).  Whether or not antitrust standing and injury are disaggregated matters little in 
terms of the outcome of antitrust cases:  without either, a plaintiff cannot recover damages, and without 
showing a likelihood of antitrust injury, a plaintiff cannot obtain an injunction.  See Roger D. Blair and 
Jeffrey L. Harrison, Rethinking Antitrust Injury, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 1539, 1551 (1989) [hereinafter Blair 
& Harrison, Rethinking] (“Whether these two tests are viewed as components of a general test for 
antitrust standing or as separate tests with the first addressing antitrust injury and the second addressing 
antitrust standing is functionally inconsequential.”). 
 57. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2013). 
 58. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2013). 
 59. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2208 (2010); Bd. of Trade of 
Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). 
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collusion and monopolization.60  For a number of reasons, including a change in 
the law that made the Supreme Court’s review of antitrust cases discretionary,61 as 
well as the murkiness of the statutory text, courts have split in various ways over 
the interpretation of many aspects of antitrust laws, especially standing. 
2.  The Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court has addressed antitrust standing in nine cases.62  For the 
purposes of this Note, the most important are Hanover Shoe, Illinois Brick,  
UtiliCorp, McCready and Associated General Contractors (“AGC”).  
Unfortunately, read separately or together, these cases fail to articulate a coherent 
test to determine whether a plaintiff has antitrust standing.  AGC lays out a number 
of relevant factors that courts consider in determining whether to hold that a 
plaintiff has antitrust standing, while the other cases deal with the standing 
consequences of circumstances where, as in the art authentication context, the 
plaintiff has an attenuated relationship with the defendant. 
None of these cases have been overturned, and they continue pull litigants, 
scholars and market participants in conflicting directions.  Courts and 
commentators face difficulty in attempting to distill uncontroversial principles of 
antitrust standing, but certain concerns that animate antitrust standing inquiries do 
emerge.  For example, the Court has worried about the risk that a defendant may 
pay multiple damage awards for the same bad conduct and, inversely, about the 
danger that too much restriction on access to courts might diminish the motivation 
for plaintiffs to police antitrust violations.  In order to show how this doctrine 
developed, the cases are described chronologically below. 
a.  Brunswick and the Dawn of Antitrust Standing 
Before the phrase “antitrust standing” was coined, the Supreme Court held in 
Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat that the plaintiffs had failed to allege an injury of 
the sort that the antitrust laws were designed to prevent, and that the jury verdict in 
favor of the plaintiffs was therefore to be reversed.63  Brunswick did not speak in 
terms of standing, but it did limit the types of recoverable injuries in antitrust suits.  
Antitrust injury was determined by a two-part inquiry: (1) Was “the injury of the 
type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent,” and (2) did it flow “from that 
 
 60. Posner, Antitrust Law, supra note 32, at 33-50. 
 61. Id. at 130-31. 
 62. Kansas v. UtiliCorp United, Inc., 497 U.S. 199 (1990); Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum 
Co., 495 U.S. 328 (1990); Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986); Matsushita 
Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., 
Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983); Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 
465 (1982); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979); Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 
(1977); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977). 
 63. 429 U.S. at 489 (“We therefore hold that the plaintiffs . . . must prove antitrust injury, which 
is to say injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which 
makes defendants’ acts unlawful.”). 
37.2 EDGAR NOTE FINAL (BL) (DO NOT DELETE) 1/9/2014  9:15 PM 
2014] ANTITRUST STANDING IN ART AUTHENTICATION CASES 257 
which makes defendants’ acts unlawful”?64  Currently, most courts and 
commentators view antitrust injury as analytically distinct from, but related to, 
antitrust standing, or as a necessary but not sufficient component of antitrust 
standing.  The importance and vitality of the antitrust injury concept varies by 
circuit.65 
b.  Hanover Shoe, Illinois Brick and Indirect Purchaser Status 
Hanover Shoe held that it is no defense to an antitrust violation that the plaintiff 
passed its injury onto consumers in the market.66  The plaintiff in that case leased 
shoemaking equipment directly from the defendant, which had monopolized the 
market for shoe-production machinery.67  The defendant argued that Hanover Shoe 
had passed any damages it suffered from the monopolization on to its customers in 
the form of higher prices.68  The Supreme Court held, “[a]s long as the seller 
continues to charge the illegal price, he takes from the buyer more than the law 
allows,”69 rendering unavailable the “passing-on” defense. 
In Illinois Brick, the State of Illinois and local governments sued concrete block 
manufacturers, alleging that they had conspired to raise prices for concrete 
blocks.70  The governments were indirect purchasers, because they bought the 
concrete from a contractor who had purchased directly from the manufacturer.  The 
manufacturers argued that the plaintiffs lacked antitrust standing to sue, because 
Hanover Shoe made the manufacturers liable to the contractors.71  The Supreme 
Court agreed, framing the issue as the same one presented in Hanover Shoe:  
“whether the overcharged direct purchaser should be deemed . . . to have suffered 
the full injury from the overcharge.”72  The Court held that the direct purchaser had 
suffered the only full injury, and that an indirect purchaser cannot have antitrust 
standing against a price fixer.73 
The Illinois Brick–Hanover Shoe doctrine excludes indirect purchasers.  The 
exclusion may have resulted from the timing of the cases at the Supreme Court:  
when the Court decided Hanover Shoe, it was unwilling to allow a defendant to 
escape liability by arguing that two wrongs (the antitrust violation and the passing 
on of higher prices) made a right.  But once that case was decided, the Court could 
not allow every potential plaintiff in a supply chain to sue the alleged antitrust 
violator.74  This chronological accident granted a windfall to direct purchasers, who 
 
 64. Id. 
 65. See infra Part I.B.3 for the Circuits’ varying approaches to antitrust standing and how 
antitrust injury relates to the relevant inquiries. 
 66. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494 (1968).  
 67. Id. at 482.  
 68. Id.  
 69. Id. at 489. 
 70. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).  
 71. Id. at 722.  
 72. Id. at 726. 
 73. Id. at 734. 
 74. See Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 765 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“If Hanover Shoe . . . had not 
preceded this case, and were it not ‘on the books,’ I am positive that the Court today would be affirming, 
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may pass on injuries they suffer to customers and still recover treble damages, and 
it shut the courthouse doors on indirect purchasers who may lack the opportunity to 
pass on their injuries.75 
c.  Blue Shield v. McCready 
Decided five years after Illinois Brick, Blue Shield v. McCready76 is the high 
water mark for a liberal conception of antitrust standing.77  In McCready, the 
plaintiff subscribed to an employer-provided insurance plan.  When the insurer 
refused to reimburse McCready for psychological treatment, she sued, alleging a 
violation of the antitrust laws.78  The Supreme Court brushed aside the insurer’s 
assertion that McCready lacked standing as an indirect purchaser, since her 
employer took money from her paycheck to purchase the insurance plan on her 
behalf.  Instead, the Court held that the Clayton Act’s “lack of restrictive language 
reflects Congress’ expansive remedial purpose in enacting § 4:  Congress sought to 
create a private enforcement mechanism that would deter violators and deprive 
them of the fruits of their illegal actions, and would provide ample compensation to 
the victims of antitrust violations.”79  The Court then recharacterized Illinois Brick:  
instead of erecting an absolute bar to suits by indirect purchasers, the McCready 
 
perhaps unanimously, the judgment of the Court of Appeals [granting standing to the indirect 
purchasers].”); see also Barak D. Richman & Christopher R. Murray, Rebuilding Illinois Brick:  A 
Functionalist Approach to the Indirect Purchaser Rule, 81 S. Cal. L. Rev. 69, 78 (2007) (“Recent 
scholarship on Illinois Brick suggests that Justice Blackmun was correct.”). 
 75. See Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 749 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Today’s decision flouts 
Congress’ purpose and severely undermines the effectiveness of the private treble-damages action as an 
instrument of antitrust enforcement. . . .  [I]n many instances, the brunt of antitrust injuries is borne by 
indirect purchasers, often ultimate consumers of a product, as increased costs are passed along the chain 
of distribution.”).  Richard Posner and William Landes dismiss the windfall point by arguing that all 
antitrust plaintiffs get a windfall:  that’s the point of treble damages.  William M. Landes & Richard A. 
Posner, Should Indirect Purchasers Have Standing to Sue Under the Antitrust Laws?  An Economic 
Analysis of the Rule of Illinois Brick, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. 602, 634 (1976). 
 76. 457 U.S. 465 (1982). 
 77. “Liberal” here means most likely to allow a suit to proceed.  Interpretations of antitrust laws 
often subvert our expectations about “liberal” and “conservative” approaches to legal methods:  jurists 
like Judge Posner, Judge Easterbrook, and Justice Scalia take a purposivist approach to reading the 
Sherman and Clayton Acts, while liberals like Justice Brennan, the author of the Court’s opinion in 
McCready, hew more closely to the statutory text in opposition to erecting barriers to court.  For 
Posner’s views, see Posner, Antitrust Law, supra note 32, at 2 (asserting that the purpose of the antitrust 
laws is to maximize Kaldor-Hicks efficiency).  For Easterbrook’s approach, see, e.g., U.S. Gypsum Co. 
v. Indiana Gas Co., Inc., 350 F.3d 623 (7th Cir. 2003) (permitting complaint sounding in antitrust to 
survive motion to dismiss without analyzing text of Clayton and Sherman acts).  For Scalia, see Bus. 
Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 732 (1988) (“The Sherman Act adopted the 
term ‘restraint of trade’ along with its dynamic potential.  It invokes the common law itself, and not 
merely the static content that the common law had assigned to the term in 1890.”); Antonin Scalia, The 
Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1184 (1989) (“[I]t is perhaps easier for me than 
it is for some judges to develop general rules, because I am more inclined to adhere closely to the plain 
meaning of a text.”).  For Brennan, see McCready, 457 U.S. at 472 (engaging in textual analysis of 
Clayton Act). 
 78. McCready, 457 U.S. at 465-66. 
 79. McCready, 457 U.S. at 472. 
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Court held “that the feasibility and consequences of implementing particular 
damages theories may, in certain limited circumstances, be considered in 
determining who is entitled to prosecute an action brought under § 4.”80  McCready 
announced an antitrust standing test that looked to the nexus between the antitrust 
violation and the harm suffered, as well as to whether the nature of the injury 
sustained was one that the antitrust laws were designed to forestall.81  While some 
have argued that McCready’s retreat from a strict reading of Illinois Brick rendered 
that case obsolete,82 the Court reaffirmed an absolute bar to suits by indirect 
purchasers in Kansas v. UtiliCorp United, Inc.,83 and there does not appear to be 
any jurisprudential basis for considering Illinois Brick to be a dead letter. 
In UtiliCorp, the indirect purchasers were the people of Kansas and Missouri.  
The state residents bought their gas from public utility companies, who purchased 
from the defendants.84  Each state sued as parens patriae, arguing that the 
defendants, producers of natural gas, illegally inflated the price so that the people 
of Kansas and Missouri paid more for gas than they would have in a competitive 
market.85  The states argued that, in contrast to the situation in Illinois Brick, the 
direct purchasers had passed on all of their injury, leaving the utilities with no 
motivation to sue.86 
The Court showed none of the special solicitude toward the states that animated 
a pair of recent Article III standing cases.87  Kansas and Missouri, the Court 
decided, could not sue on behalf of their residents, because the residents were 
indirect purchasers who lacked antitrust standing.  Allowing the case to proceed 
would risk duplicative recovery from the defendants, who might also be liable to 
the public utilities for the same violation.88 
d.  Associated General Contractors 
The Supreme Court’s most recent thorough treatment of antitrust standing, 
Associated General Contractors, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters,89 
is now the starting point for most antitrust standing analyses.90  The case’s outcome 
 
 80. Id. at 475. 
 81. Id. at 478. 
 82. Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Reexamining the Role of Illinois Brick in Modern 
Antitrust Standing Analysis, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 42 (1999). 
 83. 497 U.S. 199 (1990). 
 84. Id. at 200. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 205. 
 87. See Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2535 (2011) (affirming lower 
court’s holding that states face easier standing requirements than other entities); Massachusetts v. 
E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007) (“Given that procedural right and Massachusetts’ stake in protecting 
its quasi-sovereign interests, the Commonwealth is entitled to special solicitude in our standing 
analysis.”). 
 88. UtliCorp, 497 U.S. at 212-13. 
 89. 459 U.S. 519 (1983). 
 90. See infra, Part I.B.3.a. 
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was that the plaintiff lacked standing,91 but the holding is difficult to identify.  The 
Court noted that the plaintiff, a union, was neither a consumer nor a competitor in 
the relevant market, but it also discussed a number of other factors unrelated to the 
plaintiff’s status as a consumer or a competitor.92 
The factors that the Court considered were not formulated as a “test.”  Rather, 
the Supreme Court discussed at length certain facts in the case that were relevant to 
the outcome.  Nowhere did the Court indicate whether one particular factor may be 
dispositive or how much weight to assign each factor.93  The Court noted that the 
complaint alleged “a causal connection between an antitrust violation and harm to 
the Union and . . . that the defendants intended to cause that harm.”94  Although 
those allegations militated in favor of allowing the suit to proceed, the Court 
warned that “[a] number of other factors may be controlling.”95  The Court 
summarized these other factors as “the nature of the Union’s injury, the tenuous 
and speculative character of the relationship between the alleged antitrust violation 
and the Union’s alleged injury, the potential for duplicative recovery or complex 
apportionment of damages, and the existence of more direct victims of the alleged 
conspiracy.”96  Elsewhere in the opinion, the Court noted that “the Union was 
neither a consumer nor a competitor in the market in which trade was restrained.  It 
is not clear whether the Union’s interests would be served or disserved by enhanced 
competition in the market.”97 
The lower courts have adopted divergent views on how to interpret the Supreme 
Court’s ambiguous discussion in AGC.  AGC identifies antitrust policy concerns 
and links the determination of antitrust standing to them, but beyond that 
unsatisfying conclusion, it is difficult to state the implications of AGC with 
confidence. 
3.  Confusion in the Circuit Courts 
Since none of the above Supreme Court cases have been overruled, the circuit 
courts are in some disarray about how to approach antitrust standing.  The sections 
below outline the tests that the circuit courts have divined from the Supreme 
Court’s instructions.98  
a.  The Majority Approach 
The First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, D.C. and Federal Circuits 
generally follow the same approach in determining whether a plaintiff has antitrust 
standing.  The approach comes from the Supreme Court’s discussion of factors in 
 
 91. AGC, 459 U.S. at 521. 
 92. See id. at 539-545. 
 93. See id. 
 94. Id. at 537. 
 95. Id. at 538. 
 96. Id. at 545. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See infra part I.C.2.a-d. 
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AGC that led it to deny standing to the plaintiffs; it is summarized by the First 
Circuit as follows: 
There are six nonexclusive factors to consider in determining whether a plaintiff has 
antitrust standing:  (1) the causal connection between the alleged antitrust violation 
and harm to the plaintiff; (2) an improper motive; (3) the nature of the plaintiff’s 
alleged injury and whether the injury was of a type that Congress sought to redress 
with the antitrust laws (“antitrust injury”); (4) the directness with which the alleged 
market restraint caused the asserted injury; (5) the speculative nature of the damages; 
and (6) the risk of duplicative recovery or complex apportionment of damages.99 
Despite the lack of clarity in the eponymous decision, this Note refers to the six 
nonexclusive factors as the “AGC test.” 
b.  The Consumer-or-Competitor Test 
Before holding that the plaintiff lacked antitrust standing, the AGC court 
acknowledged that it “was neither a consumer nor a competitor in the market in 
which trade was restrained.”100  Despite AGC’s discussion of other factors, some 
courts and commentators endorse a test that depends on the plaintiff’s status as a 
consumer or competitor in the restrained market, an approach that had gained 
broader acceptance before AGC’s wide-ranging discussion.  It is important to note 
that the consumer-or-competitor test refers to consumers of a restrained product or 
competitors in the relevant market—not consumers or competitors of the 
defendant.101  In the Eighth Circuit, a consumer or competitor will have standing, 
and a plaintiff that cannot be described as such will lack standing.102  In the Third 
 
 99. Arroyo-Melecio v. Puerto Rican Am. Ins. Co., 398 F.3d 56, 72 (1st Cir. 2005) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  The Fourth Circuit folds the first two factors together into one; see Novell, 
Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 505 F.3d 302, 311 (4th Cir. 2007).  The Fifth Circuit has followed the same 
approach as the First Circuit, but has not always been consistent.  See Hughes v. Tobacco Inst., Inc., 278 
F.3d 417, 422 (5th Cir. 2001) (applying the six nonexclusive factors); but see Norris v. Hearst Trust, 500 
F.3d 454, 467 (5th Cir. 2007) (applying the consumer-or-competitor test).  (The consumer-or-competitor 
test is discussed infra Part I.B.3.b).  For the Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, D.C., and Federal Circuits, see 
Caruana v. Gen. Motors Corp., 204 F. App’x 511, 515 (6th Cir. 2006); Kochert v. Greater Lafayette 
Health Services, Inc., 463 F.3d 710, 718 (7th Cir. 2006); City of Chanute, Kan. v. Williams Natural Gas 
Co., 955 F.2d 641, 652 n.14 (10th Cir. 1992); Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 
F.3d 799, 806 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Indium Corp. of Am. v. Semi-Alloys, Inc., 781 F.2d 879, 882 (Fed. Cir. 
1985). 
 100. Associated Gen. Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 
U.S. 519, 539 (1983). 
 101. See, e.g., Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., Inc., 740 F.2d 739, 749 (9th Cir. 1984) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting) (“Ostrofe was not a competitor or consumer in the market affected by the price-fixing 
conspiracy . . . .”). 
 102. S.D. Collectibles, Inc. v. Plough, Inc., 952 F.2d 211, 213 (8th Cir. 1991).  The Seventh 
Circuit formerly applied the consumer-or-competitor test.  See In re Indus. Gas Antitrust Litig., 681 F.2d 
514, 519 (7th Cir. 1982) (granting standing only to those who, as consumers or competitors, suffered 
immediate injuries).  However, the Seventh Circuit now applies the six-factor AGC test.  See Kochert, 
463 F.3d at 718; see also Keith R. Bevan, Antitrust Law—The Need for an Express Test to Determine 
Antitrust Standing:  Ostrofe v. H. S. Crocker Co., 11 J. CORP. L. 123 (1985) (“[T]here is an underlying 
doctrine in the Supreme Court’s decisions that only competitors and consumers have standing to bring 
suit under section 4 of the Clayton Act.”). 
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Circuit, consumer-or-competitor status is only the beginning of the antitrust 
standing inquiry.  There, a proper plaintiff must be a consumer or competitor in the 
restrained market in order to show antitrust injury, a necessary but not sufficient 
component of antitrust standing, which is determined by the AGC factors.103 
The Eighth and Third Circuits are the only circuits that have applied the 
consumer-or-competitor test without a more recent case endorsing a different 
approach.104  However, the test may have some vitality outside of these courts, 
because some circuits are inconsistent in their own antitrust standing jurisprudence, 
and even after AGC have occasionally applied the consumer-or-competitor test.105 
c.  The Second Circuit’s Efficient Enforcer Test and the Ninth’s Circuit’s Injury 
Test 
In line with modern scholarship and enforcement that prizes economic 
efficiency as an important—or crucial—goal of antitrust law,106 the Second Circuit 
will find that a plaintiff lacks standing unless it is an “efficient enforcer” of the 
antitrust laws.107  Efficient enforcers are directly injured by defendants’ wrongful 
conduct, and allowing them to recover would not risk duplicative recovery from the 
defendants by other plaintiffs who may be more directly injured.  The Second 
Circuit considers a list of factors similar to the AGC factors, but more finely tuned 
to the economic concerns of antitrust enforcement: 
(1) the directness or indirectness of the asserted injury; (2) the existence of an 
identifiable class of persons whose self-interest would normally motivate them to 
vindicate the public interest in antitrust enforcement; (3) the speculativeness of the 
alleged injury; and (4) the difficulty of identifying damages and apportioning them 
among direct and indirect victims so as to avoid duplicative recoveries.108 
The Ninth Circuit’s and the Second Circuit’s tests differ only in form.  Unlike 
most courts, the Ninth Circuit does not consider antitrust standing to be distinct 
 
 103. SigmaPharm, Inc. v. Mut. Pharm. Co., Inc., 454 F. App’x 64, 68 (3d Cir. 2011).  But see In re 
Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litig., 998 F.2d 1144, 1165 (3d Cir. 1993) (applying AGC test 
without inquiring as to consumer-or-competitor status). 
 104. S.D. Collectibles, 952 F.2d. at 213. 
 105. Maxwell M. Blecher & James Robert Noblin, The Confluence of Muddied Waters:  Antitrust 
Consequential Damages and the Interplay of Proximate Cause, Antitrust Injury, Standing and 
Disaggregation, 13 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 145, 163 n.72 (1998) (citing Serfecz v. Jewel Food 
Stores, 67 F.3d 591, 596 (7th Cir. 1995); T.O. Bell v. Dow Chem. Corp., 847 F.2d 1179, 1183 (5th Cir. 
1988); Eagle v. Star-Kist Foods, Inc., 812 F.2d 538, 540 (9th Cir. 1987); General Indus. Corp. v. Hartz 
Mountain Corp., 810 F.2d 795, 809 (8th Cir. 1987)). 
 106. See infra part I.C.1. 
 107. Siti-Sites.com, Inc. v. Verizon Communications, Inc., 428 F. App’x 100, 102 (2d Cir. 2011) 
(“In addition to stating an antitrust injury, a plaintiff must show that it is an ‘efficient enforcer’ of the 
antitrust laws.”). 
 108. Daniel v. Am. Bd. of Emergency Med., 428 F.3d 408, 443 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotations 
omitted).  The Eleventh Circuit also grants standing to plaintiffs who are called “efficient enforcers” of 
the antitrust laws, but in defining who efficient enforcers are, it applies the AGC factors.  See Palmyra 
Park Hosp. Inc. v. Phoebe Putney Mem’l Hosp., 604 F.3d 1291, 1299 (11th Cir. 2010). 
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from antitrust injury.109  In the Ninth Circuit, “[a]ntitrust standing requires that a 
plaintiff show:  (1) unlawful conduct; (2) causing injury to plaintiff; (3) that flows 
from that which makes the conduct unlawful; (4) and is the type of injury that 
antitrust law guards against.”110  This is the antitrust injury requirement mandated 
by Brunswick.111  In considering the Ninth Circuit’s fourth factor, a court will 
weigh:  “(1) the nature of the plaintiff’s alleged injury; that is, whether it was the 
type the antitrust laws were intended to forestall; (2) the directness of the injury; (3) 
the speculative measure of the harm; (4) the risk of duplicative recovery; and (5) 
the complexity in apportioning damages.”112 
In other words, the Ninth Circuit calls the injury requirement of Brunswick 
“antitrust standing.”  Included in the Ninth Circuit’s antitrust standing test is a 
factor called “injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent,” which 
is met by the same showing that the Second Circuit requires of plaintiffs who 
would be efficient enforcers of the law.113  The Ninth Circuit thus engages in the 
same substantive inquiry as the Second Circuit but uses different terminology, 
folding the Second Circuit’s antitrust standing requirement into the Ninth’s 
antitrust injury test. 
4.  Simon-Whelan’s Standing Analysis 
Simon-Whelan v. Andy Warhol Foundation for the Arts114 is the only antitrust 
case against an art authentication board to have survived a motion to dismiss.115  In 
it, Joe Simon-Whelan alleged that the Warhol Foundation had conspired with the 
Warhol Authentication Board to restrain trade in the market for Warhol’s art and 
that the Foundation had monopolized the same market.116  Simon-Whelan claimed 
that the conspiracy and monopolistic practices induced the Board to falsely deny 
the authenticity of his artwork, thus devaluing it.117 
On the Foundation’s motion to dismiss, the court held that the plaintiff had 
standing on his monopolization claim because he was a would-be competitor in the 
market for authentic art by Andy Warhol.118  But the court held that Simon-Whelan 
lacked standing on his conspiracy price-inflation claim because he was not a 
 
 109. The Ninth Circuit’s standing inquiry is a case in point for Blair & Harrison, Rethinking, supra 
note 56, at 1551, who conclude that whether or not a court treats standing and injury separately is 
“functionally inconsequential.”  For a brief discussion of some opinions on the relationship between the 
two concepts, see supra note 56. 
 110. MacPherson’s Inc. v. Windermere Real Estate Serv. Co., 100 F. App’x 651, 654 (9th Cir. 
2004). 
 111. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).  See discussion 
supra, part I.B.2.a. 
 112. Knevelbaard Dairies v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 232 F.3d 979, 987 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 113. Id. 
 114. 1:07-cv-6423(LTS), 2009 WL 1457177 (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 2009). 
 115. Lacy, supra note 17, at 191. 
 116. These are violations of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (2013). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Simon-Whelan, 2009 WL 1457177, at *6. 
37.2 EDGAR NOTE FINAL (BL) (DO NOT DELETE) 1/9/2014  9:15 PM 
264 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [37:2 
consumer of art sold by the Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts.119  The 
court did not consider any other possible grounds for antitrust standing. 
There are a number of plausible ways to characterize the court’s standing 
analysis.  Because the court only looked at the plaintiff’s status as a consumer or 
competitor, I view the Simon-Whelan analysis as an application of the consumer-
or-competitor test.  That test, however, should look not to whether the plaintiff is a 
consumer who purchased from the defendant, but whether the plaintiff is a 
consumer in the relevant market.120  Therefore, the Simon-Whelan analysis appears 
to be a misapplication of the consumer-or-competitor test.  Had the court looked to 
whether Simon-Whelan was a consumer in the market for Warhol’s art, the answer 
clearly would have been yes, since he bought and sold artwork by Andy Warhol. 
Another plausible reading of the court’s analysis is that it imported the standing 
inquiry from the essential facilities doctrine.  An essential facilities antitrust claim 
arises when a defendant exclusively provides some good or service that the plaintiff 
requires, and the plaintiff claims the defendant abuses this position of exclusivity.  
In this type of case, a plaintiff has standing if he is a competitor in the relevant 
market or a consumer who purchases from the defendant.121  Yet the court 
discusses Simon-Whelan’s status as a consumer or competitor but does not discuss 
essential facilities,122 and it does not purport to add anything to antitrust standing 
doctrine; the case is thus most naturally read as a misapplication of the consumer-
or-competitor test. 
A third way to view the Simon-Whelan analysis is that it creates a new antitrust 
standing test, perhaps one especially relevant to art authentication cases.  But again, 
the court does not purport to create new law, but only to apply existing law.  The 
case, therefore, is still most easily read as a misapplication of the consumer-or-
competitor test. 
It is worth drawing attention to Simon-Whelan’s approach for a number of 
reasons.  Art cases, under whatever kind of legal theory they arise, can affect all 
areas of law that involve the market for art.  There is relatively little litigation in the 
art market, and many commentators assert that there are exceptional circumstances 
relevant to art—notably the expertise required to judge authenticity—that single 
out art cases for special treatment.  These factors combine to create a body of “art 
law” that has developed alongside of developments in fields like antitrust or fraud, 
and there is a manageable and self-referential corpus of cases that deal with art.123  
 
 119. Id. 
 120. Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., Inc., 740 F.2d 739, 749 (9th Cir. 1984) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) 
(“Ostrofe was not a competitor or consumer in the market affected by the price-fixing conspiracy . . . .”). 
 121. See Kramer v. Pollock-Krasner Foundation 890 F. Supp. 250, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).  
Defendants in Simon-Whelan argued that it was an essential facilities case, but the court did not use 
terminology from that doctrine. 
 122. Simon-Whelan, 2009 WL 1457177, at *6. 
 123. For a discussion of the limited litigation in the art field, see Kai B. Singer, Note, “Sotheby’s 
Sold Me a Fake!”—Holding Auction Houses Accountable for Authenticating and Attributing Works of 
Fine Art, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 439, 443 (2000) (“A survey of the case law in this field is 
unsatisfactory for two reasons.  On the one hand the embarrassment of having been duped coupled with 
the exorbitant expenses involved in litigation has persuaded many disappointed buyers to settle their 
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Also, the Simon-Whelan case itself has settled and will not be appealed, so the 
Second Circuit will not have the opportunity to examine the case.124  Lastly, the 
Warhol Board, previously the most visible art-antitrust defendant, has dissolved, 
limiting the opportunities for similar litigation.125  Because Simon-Whelan cannot 
be reversed and is likely to be relied on in other art cases, whether sounding in 
antitrust or not, its errors should be brought to light. 
C.  SCHOLARSHIP ON ANTITRUST STANDING 
Scholars agree that the state of the law on antitrust standing is incoherent.126  
Those who advocate for changes to the law tend to fall into two camps:  proponents 
 
claims out of court.”).  For the contention that art should be treated differently from other subject 
matters of litigation, see generally Samuel Butt, Authenticity Disputes in the Art World:  Why Courts 
Should Plead Incompetence, 28 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 71 (2004) (discussing how the technical rules of 
courts are often at odds with the realities and necessities of the art world).  
 124. Plaintiffs Drop All Charges Against the Andy Warhol Foundation; Settlement Reached, 
BOIES, SCHILLER & FLEXNER LLP (Mar. 29, 2011), http://www.bsfllp.com/news/in_the_news/000120. 
 125. Robin Pogrebin, Foundation Aims to Sell or Donate All Its Warhols, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 
2012, at C1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/06/arts/design/warhol-foundation-to-
disperse-collection.html (“This year the foundation got out of the authentication business . . . partly 
because legal disputes were a financial drain.”).  For background on the decision to dissolve, see 
Stephanie Cash, Warhol Board Quits the Authentication Game, ART IN AMERICA, Oct. 20, 2011, 
available at http://www.artinamericamagazine.com/news-opinion/news/2011-10-20/warhol-board-quits-
the-authentication-game.  Journalists were quick to seize on the ongoing criticism of the Authentication 
Board that its decisions were arbitrary at best, and declared that the Board dissolved because of lawsuits, 
particularly Simon-Whelan.  See Alison Nastasi, The Andy Warhol Authentication Board Shuts Down 
Due to Legal Crisis, FLAVORWIRE (Oct. 20, 2011, 7:30 PM), http://flavorwire.com/222697/the-andy-
warhol-authentication-board-shuts-down-due-to-legal-crisis; Julia Halperin, Warhol Authentication 
Board to Dissolve Due to Millions of Dollars in Legal Fees, ARTINFO (Oct. 25, 2011), 
http://www.blouinartinfo.com/contemporary-arts/article/38912-warhol-authentication-board-to-dissolve-
due-to-millions-of-dollars-in-legal-fees.  The Warhol Foundation averred that it was dissolving the 
Board to allow the Foundation to devote more attention to charitable projects.  See Statement from the 
Board of Directors, THE ANDY WARHOL FOUNDATION, http://www.warholfoundation.org/legacy/ 
authentication_procedure.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2013). 
 126. LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST:  AN INTEGRATED 
HANDBOOK § 17.2 (2d ed. 2006); Jonathan M. Jacobson & Tracy Greer, Twenty-One Years of Antitrust 
Injury:  Down the Alley with Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 273, 288 (1998) 
(“Despite the improvements to antitrust analysis that have resulted from the antitrust injury doctrine, one 
recurring problem that has developed in the cases decided after Brunswick is the courts’ confusion as to 
the meaning of ‘standing’ and the role of ‘antitrust injury’ in ‘standing’ analysis.”); Bevan, supra note 
102, at 123-24 (“[T]he Supreme Court has not been effective in its attempt to clarify antitrust standing . . 
. .”).  One scholar purports to know what antitrust standing and antitrust injury are, but acknowledges 
that “[t]he courts experience difficulties of several distinct kinds in applying the doctrine.”  Ronald W. 
Davis, Standing on Shaky Ground:  The Strangely Elusive Doctrine of Antitrust Injury, 70 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 697, 700 (2003).  In an odd twist, Davis states that he can determine “the true meaning of antitrust 
injury by examining how courts have frequently mistaken something else for antitrust injury.”  Id.  Since 
“antitrust injury” is purely judge-created, it doesn’t make sense that the judges in the common-law 
process of creating the concept can do it wrong in such a way that a non-judge can elucidate what the 
judges are trying to create.  Davis’s article tries to hide the opinions underlying its conclusions by 
asserting that antitrust injury exists in some objective way and that courts with whom he disagrees are 
erroneous, but it may be better to view those courts as occupying a normative position distinct from that 
of Davis. 
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of applying the “Chicago School” of economic analysis of law to antitrust and 
proponents of broader access to courts.  A brief summary of these two scholarly 
positions follows. 
1.  The Chicago School 
In the 1970’s, scholars connected to the University of Chicago and their allies 
argued that the goal of the antitrust laws ought to be maximizing economic 
efficiency.127  They disagreed on the proper measure of efficiency, but did succeed 
in shifting the federal government’s enforcement policies, from breaking up large 
companies simply because they were large, to maximizing efficiency by promoting 
a competitive marketplace.128 
The rival measures of efficiency are Kaldor-Hicks, or potential Pareto 
efficiency, on the one hand, and consumer surplus on the other.129  The Kaldor-
Hicks tradeoff is a way of measuring an event’s net effect on social welfare:  if 
consumers lose a little due to an aggregation of market power by producers, but 
producers gain a lot, then the market power yields “a net increase in total welfare 
under the Kaldor-Hicks standard.”130  Such an aggregation of market power would 
fail if the goal of the antitrust laws were to maximize consumer surplus, in the 
sense of generating the greatest wealth for individuals at the end of the supply 
chain (usually by lowering prices).131 
 
 127. See Robert H. Bork, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF, 91 (1978); 
Posner, Antitrust Law, supra note 32. 
 128. See Dep’t of Justice and Fed. Trade Comm., Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 10 (Aug. 19, 
2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf.  “Enforcement policy” 
here refers to the guidelines that the Antitrust Division of DOJ publishes (discussed in Posner, Antitrust 
Law, supra note 32, at 131-32).  Certainly, the Antitrust Division has come under fire for its 
enforcement practices, which certain commentators view as closely related to political axes that the 
parties controlling the government have to grind.  Those criticisms fault the Department for not 
following its policies rather than for setting policies different from its own guidelines.  See, e.g., Jay L. 
Himes, When Caught With Your Hand in the Cookie Jar . . . Argue Standing, 41 RUTGERS L.J. 187, 194 
(2009).   
 129. For the view that Kaldor-Hicks or potential Pareto efficiency should (and does) prevail, see 
Posner, Antitrust Law, supra note 32, at 2.  For the view that maximizing consumer surplus would 
vindicate Congress’s intent in passing the antitrust laws, see Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the 
Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust:  The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS 
L.J. 65, 76 (1982) (“This Article argues that Congress decided that consumers were entitled to the 
benefits of a competitive economic system.  Consumers were deemed entitled to the ‘consumers’ 
surplus’ because Congress regarded the competitive scenario as the normal one.”); see also Alan Devlin 
& Bruno Peixoto, Reformulating Antitrust Rules to Safeguard Societal Wealth, 13 STAN. J.L. BUS. & 
FIN. 225, 227 n.9 (2008) (“Potential Pareto improvement is synonymous with Kaldor Hicks efficiency.” 
(citing RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 12 (Aspen 6th ed. 2003))). 
 130. Peter J. Hammer, Antitrust Beyond Competition:  Market Failures, Total Welfare, and the 
Challenge of Intramarket Second-Best Tradeoffs, 98 MICH. L. REV. 849, 867 (2000).  
 131. Generally, consumer surplus is synonymous with “consumer welfare.”  However, Judge Bork, 
employing idiosyncratic terminology, used the phrase “consumer welfare” to mean aggregate social 
welfare.  See Bork, supra note 127, at 372-74.  Professor Salop noted that consumer welfare and 
aggregate social welfare “come closer together in merger analysis if they are interpreted as long-term 
welfare standards and it is assumed that merger-specific cost-savings and other innovations will be 
rapidly imitated or emulated by other firms, increasing the rate of pass-on to consumers.”  Steven C. 
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It is accepted among many—notably Judge Posner, a major proponent of the 
Chicago School—that scholars who favor using Kaldor-Hicks efficiency to guide 
antitrust policy have “won” the battle, at least as far as antitrust scholarship and 
federal enforcement policy are concerned.132  However, Posner’s account may be 
more normative than positive:  other scholars maintain that the Supreme Court 
views the goal of antitrust policy as maximizing consumer surplus.133  
Additionally, economists who subscribe to the view that Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is 
a desirable goal for antitrust enforcement may still disagree over what policy 
outcomes their approach dictates in given circumstances.134 
In deciding what the optimal rule for standing would be, economists argue that 
the focus must be on deterring anticompetitive behavior without overcompensating 
plaintiffs (and thereby imposing costs on society that are no better than the costs 
from collusion or monopoly).  The rule emerges that an “efficient enforcer” is a 
plaintiff who has low information costs in investigating alleged antitrust violations, 
who is genuinely injured by defendants’ anticompetitive conduct, whose damages 
are easy for courts to calculate and who will not recover damages that another 
plaintiff also will recover.135 
2.  Calls for Broader Access to Courts 
Despite Posner’s bullish account of the primacy of his own point of view, some 
scholars lament the gradual limitations on standing that it seems to have inspired.136  
Those who favor greater access to court would weaken the antitrust standing 
inquiry, making it easier for injured parties to enforce the law and thereby 
increasing the deterrent effect on potential violators.  These scholars, not unlike 
Justice Brennan dissenting in Illinois Brick,137 tend to focus on the breadth of the 
 
Salop, Anticompetitive Overbuying by Power Buyers, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 669, 687 n.45 (2005). 
 132. See, e.g., Posner, Antitrust Law, supra note 32, at vii (noting that the author dropped the 
subtitle “An Economic Perspective” because at this point, there is virtually no other viable perspective); 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 37, at 15 (2005) (“The neoclassical model of economic welfare provides 
antitrust with many of its general principles.”). 
 133. Steven C. Salop, Exclusionary Conduct, Effect on Consumers, and the Flawed Profit-
Sacrifice Standard, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 311, 329 (2006) (citing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 103-
04, for the proposition that the Sherman Act “focuses on the net impact on consumer welfare, that is, 
market price and output” and citing sources for controversy over what standard should guide antitrust 
policy). 
 134. Compare Landes & Posner, supra note 75, at 604 (“[Economic] analysis leads us to conclude 
that allowing indirect purchasers to sue would probably retard rather than advance antitrust 
enforcement.”), with HOVENKAMP, supra note 37, at 74-76 (arguing that injuries sustained by direct and 
indirect purchasers are different in kind, and therefore there is no economic justification for the Illinois 
Brick rule). 
 135. Landes & Posner, supra note 75. 
 136. See, e.g., C. Douglas Floyd, Antitrust Injuries Without Antitrust Remedies, 82 MINN. L. REV. 
1 (1997); Joseph P. Bauer, The Stealth Assault on Antitrust Enforcement:  Raising the Barriers for 
Antitrust Injury and Standing, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 437 (2001); Blair & Harrison, Rethinking, supra note 
56; Richman & Murray, supra note 74, at 91 (2007) (“[P]recluding recourse to indirect purchasers 
means that justice is not delivered to every man . . . .” (internal quotation omitted)). 
 137. See Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). 
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antitrust laws and on congressional intent in passing the statutes, which seems to 
have included a desire to compensate injured plaintiffs.138  The strongest 
substantive criticism of the Chicago School is that its presumptions do not 
adequately take into account the way that people actually behave.  Even if we 
concede that maximizing the aggregate social welfare is a proper goal of antitrust 
laws, the critique goes, courts seeking to do so via standing have merely tightened 
the bolts on the courthouse doors by trading sound analysis for an unlikely 
“parade[s] of horribles.”139 
II.  THE MARKET FOR MODERN ART:  A SKETCH 
Before evaluating the standing tests discussed above, this Note will now give an 
overview of the market for modern art and its relationship with the judiciary.  
Drawing on the principles from Part I and Part II, Part III will then examine 
antitrust standing analysis in the art authentication context. 
There is no comprehensive regulation of the art market comparable to that of, 
for example, the securities market.140  Sales of art are generally governed by the 
Uniform Commercial Code and state common law.141  A great deal of money rides 
on whether the art market has confidence that a work of art is “authentic,” and 
some guarantees of authenticity are more highly valued than others.142  For 
example, a Brillo Box by Andy Warhol recently sold at auction for $37,663.143  
According to Christie’s, the consignor acquired this box from Warhol himself; 
Christie’s warranted its authenticity.144  By contrast, another box sold by Christie’s 
of the same dimensions, appearance, material and date of execution, authenticated 
by the Warhol Authentication Board, sold for more than twice the amount of the 
box that had not been authenticated by the Board.145 
In addition to the averments of independent experts, auction houses and art 
authentication boards, the art market relies on catalogues raisonnés for authoritative 
 
 138. See 51 CONG. REC. 9073 (1914) (remarks of Rep. Webb). 
 139. Bauer, supra note 136, at 443 (“I believe that the doctrines that have been formulated are 
unduly restrictive and therefore yield sub-optimal enforcement.”). 
 140. See, e.g., Reginald Bullock, Jr., Imposing the Underwriters’ Duty of Care on Art Auctioneers, 
7 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 359, 360-61 (1989) (proposing treating artworks as securities at sale); 
Brian D. Tobin, The Virtues of Common Law Theories and Disclosure Requirements in the Market for 
Fine Art, 21 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 333, 350 (2011) (refuting Bullock’s article). 
 141. See generally RALPH E. LERNER & JUDITH BRESLER, ART LAW (2012).  
 142. For background on how forgery plagues the modern art market, why it matters, and how the 
law is developing in response to authenticity problems, see generally Patty Gerstenblith, Keynote 1:  
Getting Real:  Cultural, Aesthetic and Legal Perspectives on the Meaning of Authenticity of Art Works, 
35 Colum. J.L. & Arts 321, 326 (2012). 
 143. Andy Warhol (1928-1987) | Brillo Box, CHRISTIE’S, http://www.christies.com/lotfinder/andy-
warhol-brillo-box/1983983/lot/lot_details.aspx?from=searchresults&pos=5&intObjectID=1983983&sid 
=5409bf3f-8e33-4b5b-8f2d-f0f7abec530e&page=2 (last visited Nov. 24, 2013). 
 144. See Singer, supra note 123, at 442-43 (outlining the warranties provided Southeby’s and 
Christie’s when selling modern art). 
 145. Andy Warhol (1928-1987) | Brillo Box, CHRISTIE’S, http://www.christies.com/lotfinder/andy-
warhol-brillo-box/4002288/lot/lot_details.aspx?from=searchresults&pos=2&intObjectID=4002288&sid 
=5409bf3f-8e33-4b5b-8f2d-f0f7abec530e&page=2 (last accessed Nov. 24, 2013). 
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determinations of authenticity.146  Catalogues raisonnés are intended to be 
comprehensive lists of an artist’s body of work.147  The sections below outline the 
role of arbiters of authenticity in the art market and then discuss some of the legal 
and market-based challenges facing plaintiffs who would bring suits against 
authentication boards. 
A.  THE ROLE OF ART AUTHENTICATION BOARDS 
Sometimes, a Board’s membership can lead observers to suspect a conflict of 
interest:  owners of art by the artist whose oeuvre they are responsible for defining 
often sit on art authentication boards.148 
The procedures by which authentication boards reach decisions about whether a 
given artist authored a particular work are sometimes opaque.  As the Warhol 
Board put it, “The panel adamantly refuses to disclose the reasons works are denied 
authentication.”149  Boards may respond to submissions from owners or dealers in 
art and issue opinions about the authorship of the work, or they may work with art 
foundations in producing a catalogue raisonné.150  Wrongful determinations of 
authenticity carry significant costs and may constitute an antitrust violation if they 
result from a combination in restraint of trade or unlawful monopolization. 
B.  UNIQUE OR UNUSUAL FEATURES OF BOARDS’ MARKET ROLE 
1.  Authentication Boards Do Not Sell Art 
In Simon-Whelan, the plaintiff alleged that the Andy Warhol Foundation for the 
Visual Arts, which sells art that it received from the Warhol Estate, dominated the 
Warhol Authentication Board.151  Unlike the situation alleged by Simon-Whelan, 
authentication boards typically do not sell art—and the Warhol Board did not 
purport to sell art.152  Boards can exert significant market power, or even monopoly 
 
 146. See, e.g., Peter Kraus, The Role of the Catalogue Raisonné in the Art Market, in SPENCER, 
supra note 24, at 71 (“[A]ccurate and unimpeachable catalogues raisonnés are the bedrock on which the 
confidence of the marketplace is based.). 
 147. Michael Findlay, The Catalogue Raisonné, in SPENCER, supra note 24, at 55. 
 148. See, e.g., Grant, supra note 9, at 416 (discussing makeup of Diebenkorn board).  Apparent 
conflicts of interest are not limited to the authentication board context.  See, e.g., Thome v. Alexander & 
Louisa Calder Found., 70 A.D.3d 88, 94 (2009), leave to appeal denied, 933 N.E.2d 216 (2010) 
(“Defendant Alexander S.C. Rower is the Foundation’s chairman and director, and the remaining 
individual defendants are trustees of the Foundation.  All the individual defendants are related to 
Alexander Calder by blood or marriage.”). 
 149. Levy and Scott-Clark, supra note 10. 
 150. LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 141, ch. 7 (“Often, the catalogue raisonné is prepared in 
conjunction with a foundation or other entity established by the artist’s heirs to maintain the integrity of 
the deceased artist’s work and to serve as a board of review to authenticate works of art from time to 
time.”). 
 151. Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 4, at ¶¶ 37, 60, 66, 137. 
 152. See, e.g., Kramer v. Pollock-Krasner Found., 890 F. Supp. 250, 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) 
(summarizing complaint that authentication board colluded with foundation to boost value of 
foundation’s collection, without directly benefiting board).  In many cases, members of authentication 
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power, over certain product markets, typically submarkets for the art of one 
artist.153  Unlike market participants in other sectors of the economy, authentication 
boards do not sell or produce any product—yet they control the supply of a product 
(authenticated modern art) in the market. 
The market power of authentication boards artificially alters the price of 
artwork:  authenticated artwork can be much more expensive than similar 
unauthenticated artwork.154  In extreme cases, market power may amount to 
monopoly power, specifically the power to control prices.  An authentication board 
may not be able to set prices with precision, but by branding a work as not genuine, 
they can drive its price down to near nothing.155  And a denial of authenticity to one 
work could conceivably increase the price of other authenticated works, in a 
manner similar to more familiar output restrictions. 
Another feature of corporate arbiters of art authenticity is that they are typically 
organized as non-profit entities.156  While this fact ought to have no consequence as 
a matter of legal doctrine,157 as a practical matter, “the fact that [non-profit] firms 
do not distribute profits for private gain has persuaded some judges and scholars 
that non-profit firms may not be as interested in exploiting market power as for-
profit firms are assumed to be.”158  Even if non-profit status could make it more 
difficult in certain circumstances for a plaintiff to prevail on the merits of an 
antitrust claim, there is no legal reason for the defendant’s non-profit status to 
affect the plaintiff’s antitrust standing. 
2.  Authenticity May Be Determined at Any Time 
Art authenticators exert continual power over artwork, meaning that owners of 
 
boards may themselves be market participants, which would be enough to support potential antitrust 
violations.  See, e.g., Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961). 
 153. Such was the allegation in Simon-Whelan that the court found plausible.  Simon-Whelan v. 
Andy Warhol Found. for the Visual Arts, 07 CIV. 6423(LTS), 2009 WL 1457177, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 
26, 2009) (“Plaintiff has . . . sufficiently identified a relevant geographic and product market in which 
trade was allegedly unreasonably restrained or monopolized, as required to state a claim under Sections 
One and Two of the Sherman Act.”). 
 154. See supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
 155. See, e.g., Shnayerson, supra note 1, at 2  (“As a salable work, Karp [an art expert] figures, the 
small panel [by Warhol] would be worth about $90,000.  Now it’s just a decorative wall hanging.”); see 
also id. at 1 (“[T]he board’s opinion is, like a king’s, the only one that counts, and so over this huge 
domain of the global art market the board’s power is absolute.”). 
 156. See, e.g., Thome v. Alexander & Louisa Calder Found., 70 A.D.3d 88, 94 (N.Y. App. 2009), 
leave to appeal denied, 933 N.E.2d 216 (N.Y. 2010) (“The Calder Foundation is a private foundation 
formed in 1988 under New York’s Not-for-Profit Corporation Law.”); Simon-Whelan, 2009 WL 
1457177, at *1 (“The Board is a not-for profit New York corporation . . . .”). 
 157. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100 (1984)  
at n.22 (“There is no doubt that the sweeping language of § 1 applies to nonprofit entities . . . .”); United 
States v. Brown Univ. in Providence in State of R.I., 5 F.3d 658, 665 (3d Cir. 1993) (“Congress . . . 
intended this statute to embrace the widest array of conduct possible. Section one’s scope thus reaches 
the activities of nonprofit organizations . . . .”). 
 158. Thomas J. Philipson and Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the Not-For-Profit Sector, Nat’l Bur. 
Econ. Res. Working Paper 12132 at 3 (2006).  Philipson and Posner argue that there ought to be no 
different treatment of non-profit from for-profit firms as a matter of antitrust policy.  Id. at 27. 
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art may be subjected to adverse determinations of authenticity long after the statute 
of limitations has run for causes against the seller.  The antitrust significance of this 
aspect of the market is that authentication arbiters exert even more market power 
than other organizations, like certification organizations, that have been determined 
to be subject to the Sherman and Clayton Acts.159  The challenge that plaintiffs face 
with respect to authentication arbiters’ role in the market for art is that the arbiters’ 
ongoing power over the art market stems from the reliance of the market on their 
opinions. 
In this regard, the arbiters have two analogues:  securities rating agencies, and 
experts whose opinions are challenged under the Lanham Act for product 
disparagement.160  Plaintiffs in both of these situations face significant bars to 
antitrust claims.  In the case of securities ratings agencies, it has been noted that 
“the First Amendment does not allow antitrust claims to be predicated solely on 
protected speech.”161  Antitrust claims based on product disparagement face 
additional hurdles.  At least one court has suggested a categorical bar to such 
suits.162  Even if other courts are not willing to ban the cases altogether, a leading 
treatise by Philip Areeda and Donald Turner, relied on by the Ninth Circuit,163 has 
advocated for a very narrow view of antitrust claims predicated on an asserted 
violation of the Lanham Act.  Under this approach a plaintiff must show 
by cumulative proof that the representations were (1) clearly false, (2) clearly 
material, (3) clearly likely to induce reasonable reliance, (4) made to buyers without 
knowledge of the subject matter, (5) continued for prolonged periods, and (6) not 
readily susceptible of neutralization or other offset by rivals.164 
Two considerations counsel against assuming that the product disparagement 
antitrust case law will prohibit antitrust cases against art authentication boards.  
First, boards do in fact control the supply (if not, sensu stricto, output) of the 
relevant product:  here, art that the market considers genuine.  Art that has been 
authenticated by the relevant board is different in kind from art that has been denied 
authenticity.  For the reason that cubic zirconium and diamonds do not occupy the 
same niche in the jewelry market, an authenticated silk-screened portrait by Andy 
Warhol is not in the same product market as a silk-screened portrait determined to 
 
 159. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492 (1988); Radiant Burners, 
Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656, 658 (1961). 
 160. Indeed, one commentator has suggested that product disparagement is the appropriate cause 
of action to assert in the case of wrongful denials of authenticity of artwork.  See generally Jeffrey 
Orenstein, Comment, Show Me the Monet:  The Suitability of Product Disparagement to Art Experts, 13 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 905 (2005). 
 161. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody’s Investor’s Servs, Inc., 175 F.3d 848, 860 
(10th Cir. 1999).  Antitrust claims may, however, be predicated on anticompetitive conduct executed by 
means of otherwise protected speech.  Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 
(1978). 
 162. Sanderson v. Culligan Int’l Co., 415 F.3d 620, 624 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Commercial speech is 
not actionable under the antitrust laws.”). 
 163. Am. Prof’l Testing Serv., Inc. v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Legal & Prof’l Pub’ns, 108 F.3d 
1147, 1153 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 164. AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 40, at 279. 
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be, as the Warhol Board would put it, “not the work of Andy Warhol.”165  The 
former can sell for $2,000,000, while the latter is comparatively worthless and 
“removed from the market.”166 
Secondly, the case law of the Second Circuit, where most art cases arise, is more 
sympathetic to product disparagement antitrust plaintiffs than is the Ninth Circuit.  
In National Association of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers., Inc. v. Ayerst 
Laboratories, the plaintiffs were sellers of a generic drug that competed with the 
defendants’ brand-name product.167  The defendants sent a letter to pharmacists 
from a doctor, suggesting that dispensing the generic drug for indications that the 
FDA had only authorized the brand-name drug could expose the pharmacists to 
legal liability.168  The plaintiffs alleged, among other causes, violation of section 2 
of the Sherman Act.169  The Second Circuit outlined the Areeda and Turner 
factors,170 but only treated them as considerations before deciding not to dismiss 
the complaint.171  In other words, the Ninth Circuit treats the Areeda and Turner 
factors as a six-prong test, each prong of which is a necessary condition, while the 
Second Circuit reads the factors as considerations, more or less independent from 
each other, relevant to determining whether a plaintiff has stated a claim.172 
Irrespective of the challenges involved with product disparagement-based 
antitrust claims, the fact that authentication boards have ongoing power over the 
value of artwork makes antitrust laws particularly useful in attacking an abuse of 
the boards’ position.  Owners of artwork bear the whole risk that a work of art may 
be deemed inauthentic after the four-year statute of limitations for breach of 
implied warranty has run (or after the expiration of the more generous five-year 
express warranty that certain sellers include).173  The fact that authentication boards 
are dissimilar in some ways from traditional antitrust defendants—like 
manufacturers or competitors—does not mean they should be excused from 
curtailing competition in the market for art when they make wrongful 
determinations of authenticity. 
 
 165. Shnayerson, supra note 1, at 1. 
 166. Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 4, at ¶¶ 148, 184, Simon-Whelan v. Andy 
Warhol Found. for the Visual Arts, 07 CIV. 6423(LTS), 2009 WL 1457177 (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 2009).  
Indeed, the product market that the Southern District found adequate in Simon-Whelan was that for 
“authentic” works by Warhol.  2009 WL 1457177, at *6. 
 167. 850 F.2d 904, 906 (2d Cir. 1988). 
 168. Id. at 907-908. 
 169. Id. at 906. 
 170. See supra text accompanying note 108. 
 171. Pharmaceutical Mfrs., 850 F.2d at 916. 
 172. See also TYR Sport, Inc. v. Warnaco Swimwear, Inc., 709 F. Supp. 2d 821, 838 (C.D. Cal. 
2010) (“[U]nlike the Ninth Circuit, which requires a plaintiff to satisfy all of the six Harcourt Brace 
elements, the Second Circuit apparently does not find each element mandatory.”) (citation omitted).  
The Harcourt Brace elements are the Areeda and Turner factors.  See id. 
 173. See Rosen v. Spanierman 894 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1990), and William W. Stuart, Authenticity of 
Authorship and the Auction Market, 54 ME. L. REV. 71, 93 (2002). 
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C.  SHOULD COURTS AVOID INVOLVEMENT? 
A prominent argument in discussions about liability for participants in the art 
market—and one not limited to the antitrust context—is that courts should avoid 
involvement altogether because they are ill-suited to making authenticity 
determinations.  Art authentication is a subjective practice and courts will try to 
avoid declaring whether a given work of art ought to meet the market’s standards 
for authenticity.174  As Justice Holmes put it, “It would be a dangerous undertaking 
for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the 
worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious 
limits.”175 
One scholar, Samuel Butt, has argued that “courts should not adjudicate disputes 
that concern authenticity in cases where the court becomes the determinant of the 
authenticity of a work by application of the relevant laws and legal standards.”176  
Butt contends that “the question of authenticity is too important to be left to the 
mechanical application of the burden of proof, which, in the art context, gives a 
significant advantage to the defendant.”177  He also concludes that, since “a finding 
that the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proof implicitly vindicates the 
defendant,”178 courts should decline to hear authentication disputes in the first 
place. 
Moreover, certain market participants stress that the art market will not accept 
determinations of authenticity by courts.179  There is no reason to doubt this 
conclusion, and the phenomenon of the market rejecting a court’s determination 
has been documented at least twice.180  The argument goes that the market’s 
distrust of courts’ authenticity determinations (in this country, at least) renders the 
courts inappropriate fora for evaluating authenticity.181 
In addition to scholarly concerns, several cases dealing with the authenticity of 
 
 174. Orenstein, supra note 160, at 908-09. 
 175. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903). 
 176. Butt, supra note 123, at 72. 
 177. Id. at 81. 
 178. Id. at 82. 
 179. See, e.g., Francis V. O’Connor, Authenticating the Attribution of Art:  Connoisseurship and 
the Law in the Judging of Forgeries, Copies, and False Attributions, in SPENCER, supra note 24, at 23 
(decrying “the cockeyed connoisseurship imposed by the courts in a crunch.”); see also SPENCER, supra 
note 24, at 189 (noting the art market’s rejection of court’s finding that Calder mobile was genuine in 
favor of expert opinion determined not credible by court). 
 180. See Butt, supra note 123, at 81 (“A similar result likely occurred in Herstand, where the 
disavowal of the work by the artist outweighed the decision of the court that a triable issue of fact 
existed as to authenticity.”); Steven Mark Levy, Authentication and Appraisal of Artwork, in ART LAW 
HANDBOOK 858 (Roy Kaufman ed., 2000) (discussing same Calder authentication as SPENCER, supra 
note 24). 
 181. According to Van Kirk Reeves, Establishing Authenticity in French Law, in SPENCER, supra 
note 24, at 227, French courts may determine authenticity as a matter of law; see also Thome v. 
Alexander and Louisa Calder Foundation, 70 A.D.3d 88, 101 (N.Y. App. 2009) (accepting this 
conclusion as true, noting that the New York courts had no such power, and arguing that the court’s 
handicap in this regard precluded the plaintiff from prevailing). 
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artworks, which rely on one another regardless of the substantive law at issue,182 
suggest that courts will not lightly make pronouncements on the authenticity vel 
non of art.  Two frequently cited cases are discussed below:  Thome v. Alexander & 
Louisa Calder Foundation,183 and Hahn v. Duveen.184 
In Thome, the plaintiff owned a stage set allegedly created by the artist 
Alexander Calder.185  Although the plaintiff produced uncontested letters from the 
artist declaring that everything was “OK” with the set,186 for unknown reasons, the 
Foundation—comprised of Calder’s relatives who owned and dealt in Calder’s 
art—refused to authenticate the set.187  The plaintiff sued in fraud, asking the court 
for a declaratory judgment that the work was genuine and seeking an injunction 
forcing the defendants to include the work in the Calder catalogue raisonné.188  The 
court declined such extraordinary relief, declaring, “If buyers will not buy works 
without the Foundation’s listing them in its catalogue raisonné, then the problem 
lies in the art world’s voluntary surrender of that ultimate authority to a single 
entity.”189 
Hahn established that, partially due to First Amendment concerns, experts could 
not be held liable for good faith expressions of opinions.190  Today, practitioners 
continue to aver that the First Amendment presents a challenging hurdle to 
plaintiffs in all kinds of suits based on authentication determinations, including 
those sounding in antitrust.191  Moreover, even courts that are not asked to issue 
injunctions directing market participants’ behavior are hesitant to declare the 
authorship of a given work of art.192  In assessing the judgment of experts, courts 
 
 182. See supra note 22. 
 183. 70 A.D.3d 88 (N.Y. App. 2009). 
 184. 234 N.Y.S. 185 (Sup. Ct. 1929). 
 185. 70 A.D.3d at 94-95.  As the court did, the Note will treat the allegations by Thome as true.  
Id. at 94. 
 186. Id. at 94-95. 
 187. Id. at 110. 
 188. Id. at 96.  The statute of limitations had run on a number of more plausible legal theories like 
breach of contract, antitrust, and product disparagement that, if successful, would have entitled the 
plaintiff to damages.  Id. at 104-11. 
 189. Id. at 103.  In a rather curious moment of dicta, the court seemed to have contradicted this 
statement earlier in the opinion, writing that “in the case of a contemporary artist whose estate owns the 
reproduction rights to his or her works, the estate will have the right to preclude other authorities from 
publishing competing catalogues raisonné [sic] of the artist’s work . . . .”  Id. at 97.  I consider this to be 
a contradiction, because if the rights holders could forbid others from publishing competing catalogues, 
the art world’s surrender to the Foundation’s catalogue would not be wholly voluntary.  The statement is 
curious because the only authority it cites is an essay by an antiquarian book dealer (Kraus, supra note 
146), who in turn refers in general terms to the French and German courts.  Additionally, the statement 
flies in the face of clearly established copyright law that publishing a collector’s guide, even with 
images copyright of which is held by another, is fair use.  See, e.g., Ty, Inc. v. Publications Intern. Ltd., 
292 F.3d 512, 518-19 (7th Cir. 2002) (characterizing collector’s guides as “not derivative works” and 
therefore “sheltered by the fair-use defense.”). 
 190. 234 N.Y.S. 185 (Sup. Ct. 1929). 
 191. See, e.g., Michael A. Salzman, Current Cases and Issues:  A Roundtable Discussion, 35 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 419, 439 (2012). 
 192. See, e.g., Kitchen v. Sothebys, 18 Misc. 3d 1132(A) (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2008) (“The plaintiff’s 
burden in proving the falsity of a statement concerning a work of art was described by the trial court in 
Hahn as ‘very heavy,’ a description that remains valid today.”). 
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following Hahn strike a deferential posture, imposing a high bar on plaintiffs 
seeking to convince the court that an expert has erred.193 
Judicial skepticism of courts’ ability to evaluate authenticity and robust 
protections for expert opinions pose significant obstacles to plaintiffs.  While these 
concerns pervade art authentication cases, they should not animate the antitrust 
standing inquiry.  Whatever relevance they have to the merits, the question facing a 
court in determining whether a plaintiff should have standing relates to the injury 
alleged by the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s relationship with the defendant, not the 
potential success of available affirmative defenses. 
III.  ARE ANTITRUST CLAIMS AGAINST ART AUTHENTICATORS A 
BUST? 
Having surveyed the legal doctrine relevant to antitrust standing and the relevant 
features of the art market, we turn to the crucial question of how courts ought to 
evaluate antitrust standing in cases against arbiters of the authenticity of art.  In the 
course of examining the standing tests available to courts, this Note will highlight 
the problems associated with the consumer-or-competitor test, both in its usual 
form and as it was applied in Simon-Whelan.  Simon-Whelan had two central 
claims:  (1) that the Warhol Board wrongly denied authenticity to genuine works by 
Warhol in the market, meaning that the price Simon-Whelan paid for a silk-
screened self-portrait by Warhol was higher than the price he would have paid in a 
competitive market;194 and (2) that Simon-Whelan could not sell his stock at fair 
market value because the Board unjustifiably denied authenticity to this silk-
screened portrait.195  The plaintiff was granted standing as a would-be competitor 
in the market for selling Warhols.  He was denied standing as a purchaser of 
Warhol’s art. 
A.  EVALUATING OPTIONS ON THE ANTITRUST STANDING MENU 
1.  The Consumer-or-Competitor Test 
Under the consumer-or-competitor test, a buyer or seller of art will generally 
have antitrust standing to sue art authenticators, provided the plaintiff defines the 
relevant market convincingly and participates directly in it.  If the Simon-Whelan 
court had applied the consumer-or-competitor test correctly, the plaintiff would 
have been granted antitrust standing as a consumer in the relevant market—that for 
the art of Andy Warhol.196 
 
 193. See, e.g., Krahmer v. Christie’s Inc., 911 A.2d 399, 406 (Del. Ch. 2006) (“Christie’s adhered 
to prevailing business practices in the auction house market when it attributed the painting . . . .”); id. at 
406 n.27 (“[I]t would stretch reason to expect Christie’s to spend thousands of dollars and hundreds of 
employee hours researching a $35,000 painting.”). 
 194. Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 4, at ¶ 196. 
 195. Id. at ¶¶ 20-21. 
 196. Simon-Whelan v. Andy Warhol Found. for the Visual Arts, Inc., 1:07-cv-6423 (LTS), 2009 
WL 1457177 at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 2009) (discussing geographic and product market). 
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Unfortunately, if courts aim to vindicate the policy concerns that animated the 
Supreme Court in AGC, especially that of avoiding the risk of duplicative recovery 
against defendants,197 the consumer-or-competitor test risks being overinclusive.  
Virtually anyone who buys or sells artwork is a consumer or competitor in a 
relevant product market, and virtually anyone who intends to sell art can be 
considered a “would-be competitor.”198  Because a work of art may change hands 
several times, there will be a high risk of duplicative recovery against art 
authenticators if a court holds that consumers or competitors generally have 
antitrust standing against them. 
The risk of multiple recoveries is that each link in the chain of custody of a work 
of art is a consumer in the market for that art.  Normally, the risk of multiple viable 
plaintiffs for the same violation is avoided by the Illinois Brick–Hanover Shoe 
doctrine, discussed above in Part I.B.2.b, which prohibits indirect purchasers from 
suing antitrust violators.  However, the chain of custody in the art market is not 
comparable to a typical supply chain in, for example, the automobile market.  The 
producer is the artist; the first purchaser (if the artwork is transferred by purchase) 
is the direct purchaser from the artist; all subsequent purchasers are indirect 
purchasers from the artist and direct purchasers from whoever preceded them in the 
chain.  But the art authenticator is absent from the chain of custody:  no one is a 
direct or indirect purchaser from the art authenticator.  Although Hanover Shoe 
prevents the authenticator from raising a passing-on defense, Illinois Brick does not 
shield the authenticator from multiple liability.  Illinois Brick dealt only with 
indirect purchasers from defendants.  If the board does not sell art, the plaintiff is 
not an indirect purchaser from the board.199 
It could conceivably be argued that the consumer-or-competitor test is a proxy 
for the efficient enforcer test and that, notwithstanding Simon-Whelan’s 
examination of whether the plaintiff was a consumer who purchased the 
defendant’s products, the case at least attempted to follow Second Circuit doctrine 
on antitrust standing.  Commentators and courts have argued that consumers and 
competitors are the most efficient enforcers of the antitrust laws and that a 
plaintiff’s status as a consumer or competitor should be dispositive, or at least very 
important, in determining whether the plaintiff has antitrust standing.200  However, 
 
 197. See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of 
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 530 (1983) (“The legislative history of the section shows that Congress was 
primarily interested in creating an effective remedy for consumers who were forced to pay excessive 
prices by the giant trusts and combinations that dominated certain interstate markets.”); Id. at 543-44 
(discussing prior cases that “have stressed the importance of avoiding . . . the risk of duplicate 
recoveries”). 
 198. Simon-Whelan noted that the Second Circuit has recognized the possibility that would-be 
competitors can have standing to sue in antitrust.  See Simon-Whelan, 2009 WL 1457177 at *6 (citing 
Daniel v. American Bd. of Emergency Medicine, 428 F.3d 408, 439 (2d Cir. 2005)). 
 199. See Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494 (1968) (in which the 
court denied the availability of a passing-on defense to all defendants).  Although contemporary 
commentators viewed Illinois Brick as a “mirror image” of Hanover Shoe, Landes & Posner, supra note 
75, at 603, the Supreme Court has restricted Illinois Brick to actual indirect purchasers without altering 
the scope of Hanover Shoe.  See Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 478 (1982). 
 200. See E. Auto Distributors, Inc. v. Peugeot Motors of Am., Inc., 573 F. Supp. 943, 947 (E.D. 
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the consumer-or-competitor test does not stand in well for the factors regularly 
considered by the Second Circuit, at least in the art market and other markets 
without the supply chains typical of manufactured goods.  The Second Circuit 
seeks to “avoid duplicative recoveries.”201  Making consumer-or-competitor status 
the touchstone of antitrust standing risks duplicative recovery in the art market, 
where the limitation on suits by indirect purchasers is irrelevant.202 
2.  Plaintiffs’ Antitrust Standing Under Simon-Whelan 
The Simon-Whelan court applied the wrong antitrust standing test incorrectly.  
The court held that Simon-Whelan had standing as a would-be competitor in the 
market for the art of Andy Warhol, but that he lacked standing as a purchaser 
because he did not purchase the painting that was denied authenticity from any of 
the defendants.203  Although the court did not explicitly state that it was applying 
the consumer-or-competitor test, this seems to be a fair reading of the decision.  
The test was wrong as a matter of doctrine because the Southern District of New 
York is within the jurisdiction of the Second Circuit,204 which does not follow the 
consumer-or-competitor test.205  The application of the consumer aspect of the test 
was also flawed because the proper inquiry in courts where that test is employed is 
whether or not the plaintiff is a consumer in the relevant product market, rather 
than a consumer of the defendant’s products.206 
If future courts follow Simon-Whelan, successful plaintiffs would have to be 
sellers of art (i.e., in competition with other sellers in the market for modern art) or 
consumers of authentication boards.  The latter situation is rare, because most 
boards do not sell artwork.  Indeed, the Warhol Board was only assumed to sell art 
because Simon-Whelan alleged collusion between the Foundation and the Board—
an allegation the court was forced to accept for the purpose of the defendant’s 
 
Va. 1983) (adopting argument that section 4 does limit standing to those plaintiffs who are efficient 
enforcers of antitrust laws and concluding, “[w]e must be extremely cautious in granting a person who is 
neither a consumer nor a competitor the right to treble damages as a private attorney general.”); Stephen 
J. Horvath III, Standing of the Terminated Employee Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 25 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 341, 367 (1983) (“Consumers and competitors are the appropriate antitrust plaintiffs, 
therefore, because their treble damage actions are a greater deterrent to parties who undertake 
anticompetitive activities.”); Nat Stern & Kevin B. Getzendanner, Gauging the Impact of Associated 
General Contractors on Antitrust Standing Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
159, 170 (1986) (“The [AGC] Court implied that a plaintiff who is not injured in her capacity as a 
consumer or competitor in the relevant market must overcome a substantial presumption against 
standing.”). 
 201. Daniel v. Am. Bd. of Emergency Med., 428 F.3d 408, 443 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 202. See supra, Part III.A.1. 
 203. Simon-Whelan v. Andy Warhol Found. for the Visual Arts, 1:07-cv-6423 (LTS), 2009 WL 
1457177, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 2009). 
 204. 28 U.S.C. § 41 (2013). 
 205. See supra, Part I.B.3.c. 
 206. See, e.g., Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co., Inc., 740 F.2d 739, 749 (9th Cir. 1984) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting) (“Ostrofe was not a competitor or consumer in the market affected by the price-fixing 
conspiracy . . . .”). 
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motion to dismiss.207  The Simon-Whelan test excludes a large number of 
potentially injured plaintiffs—consumers of art who do not sell what they own, for 
example, donors entitled to a tax deduction—from being able to assert antitrust 
claims.  For this reason courts facing similar facts should not follow this case. 
3.  Majority Approach 
The AGC factors are problematic both because they are indeterminate and 
because, when applied in an art authentication context, they do not properly 
account for the risk of duplicative recovery.208  To understand the difficulties of the 
majority approach, let us apply the test to the facts as alleged by Simon-Whelan. 
(1)  Causal connection.  The causal connections between the antitrust violation 
and the injury in both Simon-Whelan’s monopolization claim and his market 
restraint claim were direct:  the alleged violation of denying the silkscreen’s 
authenticity was a but-for cause of Simon-Whelan’s inability to sell it, and in fact it 
was the only cause of any injury the plaintiff suffered. 
(2)  Improper motive.  Simon-Whelan alleged an improper motive, accusing the 
defendants of “provid[ing] a façade of non-profit corporate credibility that obscures 
a deeply corrupt enterprise that enables defendants to reap financial and 
reputational benefit from Warhol’s art and legacy.”209 
(3)  The nature of the plaintiff’s alleged injury and whether the injury was of a 
type that Congress sought to redress with the antitrust laws (“antitrust injury”).  
This factor is particularly difficult to apply because the Supreme Court does not 
specify the proper level of generality that courts should use to inquire into 
Congress’s intent with regards to the antitrust laws.  One clear goal of antitrust law 
is protecting competition.210  If the Warhol Board’s determination of authenticity 
and its opaque authentication practices had increased information costs in the 
market for Warhol’s art, thereby making it harder for art dealers to compete with 
one another, Simon-Whelan’s suit could be viewed as vindicating this goal. 
At a lower level of generality, it cannot be argued that Congress was specifically 
concerned with art authentication practices when it passed the Sherman Act.  In 
Simon-Whelan’s complaint, he claimed that the Warhol Board’s determination 
artificially lowered the market value of his silkscreen.  Lost profits have been held 
to be actionable in antitrust,211 and the fact that a restraint lowered prices is no 
defense to a per se violation of the antitrust laws.212  But this factor probably does 
weigh against Simon-Whelan’s argument, since price inflation is the prototypical 
example of harm that Congress sought to curtail.213 
 
 207. See Simon-Whelan, 2009 WL 1457177 at *6. 
 208. See supra Part I.B.3.a. 
 209. Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 4, at ¶ 9. 
 210. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962). 
 211. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961). 
 212. See, e.g., Fashion Originators’ Guild of Am. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 312 U.S. 457, 467 
(1941) (“[A] monopoly contrary to their policies can exist even though a combination may temporarily 
or even permanently reduce the price of the articles manufactured or sold.”). 
 213. See Associated Gen. Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 
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(4)  The directness with which the alleged market restraint caused the asserted 
injury.  This factor is analytically indistinct from factor (1).  The market restraints 
of the Foundation’s domination of the Board (the section 2 claim) and the entities’ 
collusion (the section 1 claim) that led to the wrongful denial of authenticity would 
have caused the injury directly in Simon-Whelan’s case, because it is the only 
factor leading to the artificially affected prices in the art market. 
(5)  The speculative nature of the damages.  This factor would likely support 
Simon-Whelan’s antitrust standing, since he alleged that a buyer was interested in 
purchasing his painting for $2,000,000.  Therefore, assuming that claim could be 
substantiated, the measure of his compensatory damages would have been 
$2,000,000 less Simon-Whelan’s purchase price (i.e., the value to him of the 
painting that he still owns).214 
(6)  The risk of duplicative recovery or complex apportionment of damages.  If 
courts do not allow a passing-on defense in a case like Simon-Whelan, there is a 
high risk of duplicative recovery from defendants in the case of an authenticated 
work of art that changes hands a number of times before a board declares it to be 
inauthentic.  Every buyer in the chain of possession—which is not the supply chain 
envisioned by Illinois Brick—would have a claim against the board. 
The indeterminacy of the antitrust injury factor will be a problem no matter what 
standing inquiry is applied, since antitrust injury is required in every circuit.215  The 
problem that is peculiar to the AGC approach, and resolved by the Second Circuit’s 
test,216 is that risk of duplicative recovery is not adequately addressed.  In the AGC 
test, the risk of duplicative recovery depends on whether the Illinois Brick bar is 
applicable to the facts of the case.  But Illinois Brick has been narrowed by 
subsequent case law, so that it only applies to purchasers in a supply chain.217  At 
the same time, Hanover Shoe unambiguously denies all defendants the ability to 
assert a passing-on defense.  So if injuries have been passed on in a context other 
than a traditional supply chain, there is a risk of duplicative recovery against 
defendants.  In Simon-Whelan and other art authentication situations, Illinois Brick 
is too narrow to keep plaintiffs out of court, and plaintiffs can invoke the broad 
language of Hanover Shoe to prevent any defense that plaintiffs passed on the 
antitrust injury.  
4.  Efficient Enforcer Test218 
The Second and Ninth Circuits look to the following factors in determining 
whether a plaintiff has antitrust standing: 
(1) the directness or indirectness of the asserted injury; (2) the existence of an 
 
459 U.S. 519, 530 (1983). 
 Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 4, at ¶ 230. 
 215. See supra note 56. 
 216. See infra Part III.A.4. 
 217. See infra Part I.B.2.c. 
 218. Recall from Part I.B.3.c that the Second Circuit’s efficient enforcer test and the Ninth 
Circuit’s injury test are functionally equivalent. 
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identifiable class of persons whose self-interest would normally motivate them to 
vindicate the public interest in antitrust enforcement; (3) the speculativeness of the 
alleged injury; and (4) the difficulty of identifying damages and apportioning them 
among direct and indirect victims so as to avoid duplicative recoveries.219 
The only factor here not treated above in Part III.A.3 is the second, which is 
somewhat awkwardly phrased.  Courts ask whether a plaintiff has economic self-
interest in antitrust enforcement, and if so, whether a class of persons exists with 
more self-interest in enforcement.220  This factor makes the inquiry superior to the 
AGC test, because it skirts the problem of Illinois Brick’s narrowness and Hanover 
Shoe’s breadth:  a purchaser who has passed on losses is not an efficient enforcer of 
the antitrust laws because there is another potential plaintiff with greater economic 
self-interest in seeing the law enforced, namely, the person who has not passed 
losses on to anyone.  In other words, because art is not sold along a traditional 
supply chain, Illinois Brick would not prohibit purchasers of art from suing 
authenticators.  Hanover Shoe might not allow a defendant to raise a passing-on 
defense, but the Second Circuit’s inquiry into the existence of other potential 
plaintiffs effectively allows courts to bar claims by plaintiffs looking for the 
windfall of passed-on injuries plus treble damages.  Outside the art context, the 
Second Circuit’s efficient enforcer test does not skirt Hanover Shoe in the same 
way because the direct purchaser is the only potential plaintiff, even if it has passed 
on its damages, thanks to Illinois Brick. But in the context where the potential 
plaintiffs are not indirect purchasers of the art authenticator defendants, the Second 
Circuit’s test avoids the problem of Illinois Brick and Hanover Shoe and properly 
focuses on what party is most motivated to enforce the antitrust laws.  It is 
therefore the preferable inquiry for determining standing in art authentication 
antitrust cases. 
In art authentication cases, the Second Circuit’s efficient enforcer test will also 
address the key questions for antitrust standing from an economic point of view.  
Determining whether a potential plaintiff would be an efficient enforcer of the law, 
as that term is used in law-and-economics literature, depends on the answer to three 
questions:  (1) What are the information costs of the plaintiff’s lawsuit?  (2) Does 
granting a given plaintiff standing risk duplicative recovery against a defendant?  
And (3) what does the effect of granting or denying standing have on the aggregate 
incentive to enforce the antitrust laws?221 
By and large, art authentication claims will carry far lower information costs 
than the claims that have led scholars to argue for, and courts to impose, standing 
barriers.222  Unlike nationwide markets for substitutable low cost products, which 
 
 219. Daniel v. Am. Bd. of Emergency Med., 428 F.3d 408, 443 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 220. Id. at 444. 
 221. See Landes & Posner, supra note 75; see also Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. 
465, 474 (1982) (discussing duplicative recovery), and Richman & Murray, supra note 74, at 7 (2007). 
 222. For example, Simon-Whelan knew precisely how much profit he lost by not being able to sell 
his silkscreen, while economists disagree over whether or not members of a supply chain even suffer 
distinct injuries from one another as a result of an upstream violation of the antitrust laws.  See supra 
note 134. 
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come to consumers at the end of a long and complicated supply chain, most works 
of art are unique and sold by one legal entity to another at a discrete moment in 
time.  The risk of duplicative recovery is more effectively addressed in the Second 
Circuit than in the circuits that apply the AGC test, and the aggregate effect on the 
incentive to enforce the antitrust laws is the one factor in the Second Circuit’s 
analysis that does not appear in courts applying the AGC test.223 
B.  INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE 
This final section examines the institutional competence of courts to determine 
authenticity, a hurdle raised by scholars, market participants and some courts 
themselves.  This section argues that courts have the competence and duty to 
decide such cases even if they present difficult facts. 
American courts may not be able to make authenticity determinations that the art 
market will accept as authoritative, but that is not what they are asked to do in an 
antitrust case.  Rather, the courts must determine whether defendants colluded or 
monopolized a market in an unreasonable restraint of trade.224  To the extent that 
the court’s authenticity determination matters, it only goes to whether or not there 
is a violation of the antitrust laws and to the extent of damages, an evaluation that 
courts are familiar with and well positioned to undertake.  Indeed, judges must 
frequently educate themselves about unfamiliar topics in order to reach a judgment 
on the merits of a legal claim.  Courts need to evaluate matters of fact and law that 
are sometimes outside of judges’ particular areas of expertise.  To take just one 
example, Federal Circuit judges rarely publish articles in peer-reviewed scientific 
journals, but it does not follow that a federal court is incompetent to decide patent 
cases that require resolving debatable points relating to the obviousness of a given 
scientific discovery.225 
Despite having produced volumes of cases that turn on sophisticated scientific 
analyses, courts are urged not to hear art authentication cases.  Part of this argument 
is that it is very hard to adduce enough evidence to compel a court to declare a 
contested work authentic, and “a finding that the plaintiffs failed to meet their 
burden of proof implicitly vindicates the defendant.”226  This conclusion is bizarre, 
since a denial to hear a case also vindicates the defendant.  Given the American rule 
 
 223. The effect on the incentive to enforce is covered in the second factor of the Second Circuit’s 
test.  See, e.g., Daniel v. Am. Bd. of Emergency Med., 428 F.3d 408, 443 (2d Cir. 2005) (considering 
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vindicate the public interest in antitrust enforcement” as a factor). 
 224. Cf. Jane Levine, Current Cases and Issues:  A Roundtable Discussion, 35 COLUM. J.L. & 
ARTS 419, 436 (2012) (noting that in criminal fraud cases related to allegedly forged art, the burden on 
the government is to prove the elements of fraud beyond a reasonable doubt, which may or may not 
require proving authenticity in a given case). 
 225. See generally Aventis Pharma Deutschland GmbH v. Lupin, Ltd., 499 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 
2007) (analyzing whether the drugs captopril and enalapril obviously foreshadowed the discovery of 
ramipril). 
 226. See Butt, supra note 123, at 82.  Butt does not clarify how, procedurally, courts are urged to 
dismiss the case.  Possibly they are meant to declare that, as a matter of law, no quantum of proof of 
authenticity can meet some hypothetical burden on the plaintiff. 
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that each party bears its own costs of litigation,227 an early dismissal by virtue of 
institutional incompetence would constitute a greater victory for defendants than a 
final verdict in their favor, by saving them the costs of trial. 
The conclusion that courts are institutionally incapable of deciding legal 
disputes because the underlying facts involve a determination on the authenticity of 
art is a non sequitur.  Regardless of the difficulty of making factual determinations, 
courts have a duty to adjudicate disputes properly before them.  The esotericism of 
a particular subject is no reason to depart from the well established principle that 
“[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual 
to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.”228  When 
authentication boards violate antitrust laws, they cause economic harm, and the 
courts have both the institutional competence and the institutional duty to allow 
proper cases to proceed in court. 
CONCLUSION 
Trusted authenticators wield tremendous power in the market for modern art.  
Their market power exposes them to potential antitrust liability.  Because there is 
relatively little—though increasing—litigation in the art market, each reported case 
relevant to art authentication takes on an outsized significance.  In the context of 
antitrust standing, courts should resist the temptation to follow Simon-Whelan’s 
erroneous analysis.  The antitrust standing approach in Simon-Whelan was wrong 
as a matter of doctrine and policy.  Doctrine within the Second Circuit (where art 
authentication cases tend to arise) and policy properly counsel courts to inquire 
which plaintiff is an efficient enforcer of the antitrust laws and to grant antitrust 
standing to that plaintiff.  Finally, courts are the appropriate, and indeed the only, 
fora for the litigation of antitrust claims against arbiters of art authenticity. 
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